Nedarim 37 – Making money on the Torah?

Earlier, we saw that one cannot take money to teach Torah. We also noticed that when this teaching is for singing the notes of the Torah, as sung in the synagogue, or simply for watching the kids so that they don't run out during lessons, then getting paid for this is acceptable.

But which of these two reasons is the real one? Some say that the singing notes were actually given to Moses together with the rest of the Torah: when Ezra read Torah to the people, he made them "understand the reading," – which is achieved with proper notes; thus, no money can be earned for teaching that.

Others argue that "understanding the reading" refers to proper pronunciation since there are places in the Torah where the words should not be read the way they are written. However, the notes were introduced by the Sages of the court of Solomon later, and reward may be taken for teaching them.

According to the first point of view, one is not paid for singing but for watching the children. This sounds reasonable; what will the opposing side say? They will answer that boys and girls are equally taught and that little girls cause less trouble and don't run out of the room – so one is not paid for watching them, and we are back to paying for singing.

Art: Portrait of Artist's Children by Jan Matejko

Nedarim 36 – Sorry, I cannot teach you Torah

One who vowed not to provide any benefit to his fellow is not allowed to teach him Torah; however, he is allowed to teach him the moral lessons and stories about the Torah (Midrash), as well as teach Torah to his sons and daughters.

Basically, why should Torah be taught for free? Moses said, "Look, I taught you the Torah, for free, just as God commanded me," – and you should also teach for free. Then if so, why is teaching Torah considered a benefit, which one should not confer on his fellow if he vowed against him? – We mean teaching the written Torah, and one takes money for teaching the melody, not the words. Alternatively, the art of reading the written Torah is usually taught to small children, and one receives money for being their babysitter rather than a teacher. However, moral lessons are for adults, and one cannot take the reward.

The rule says one can teach the fellow's sons and daughters. This rule is the source for the view that Torah should be taught to women as well as men.

Art: A Lady With Her Daughter And Two Sons by Dutch School

Nedarim 35 – How strong are your vows?

If one declares some object forbidden to himself by a vow, just like a sacrifice, is the prohibition really that strong? For example, if he uses this object after all, does he need to bring an additional sacrifice ("Me'ila"), just as he would have for misusing a sacrifice?

Perhaps we can prove this is so from the previous ruling. There, one was allowed to return a lost object even to someone he vowed not to provide any benefit. However, he could not take the reward for this but had to give it to the Temple treasury. Does this not prove the point? – Actually, this is indeed strong proof.

We find that Rabbi Meir and the Sages argued about this exact point. And since every Sage in the Talmud builds a system of consistent teachings without contradictions, we can rely on them to verify that both points of view are logical and can be valid.

And what did Rabbi Meir and the Sages argue about? – If one prohibits himself from a loaf of bread by a vow and then eats it, he has to bring a Me'ila offering to atone - this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Sages, however, say that since this loaf is not equally prohibited to all, the concept of Me'ila does not apply. And yet, since the previous rule proves that Rabbi Meir is right, the final law follows him.

Art: Studies of bread by Spanish School

Nedarim 33 – He paid off your debt? – You don't owe him anything!

If one person (A) makes a vow not to provide any benefit to his fellow B, he (A) is still allowed to pay off B's debts. How could it be? – By paying off B's debts, A is simply "chasing a lion away from B's property." That is, he is precluding B's creditors from running after him at some future date, which is not a benefit.

But wait, it is a benefit, after all!? – This follows the opinion of Chanan, which we learned earlier: if one goes overseas and leaves his wife without sustenance, and his fellow provides her with money on his own, the husband is not obligated to repay.

Are there any other opinions? – Yes, those who disagree with Chanan say it is a benefit. Or, if you want, I can explain that the rule about paying off debts is universally accepted. I can say that loan B does not have any fixed date for payment. Then the creditors will never come to B because the "future date" mentioned above does not exist! So A provided no benefit, and even though he vowed against B, he is still allowed to do this service.

Another thing that A is allowed to do is pay the half-shekel obligation. Everyone had to pay the half-shekel yearly to provide money for daily sacrifices, but even if he did not pay in the end, he still gets the atonement; thus, paying it for one's fellow is not a benefit.

Finally, he is allowed to return the fellow's lost object because he is doing a mitzvah. If in his place, they pay for the trouble of bringing the lost object, he should donate this money to the Temple.

Art: Lost by Frederick McCubbin

Nedarim 26 – Clear mistakes

One can make an obvious mistake in his vow; if so, the vow does not count, and he does not have to fulfill it. For example, “This food is prohibited to me by a vow if I ate anything today – or if I drank today” – and then he remembers that he did eat or drink.

Another example: “Let my wife be prohibited to me by a vow since she stole my wallet – or since she hit my son” – and it turns out that she did not do such a thing. Yet another example: he sees people eating his dates and vows the dates to be prohibited to them, and then discovers that his father or his brother were with these people – all such vows are void.

In the same way, mistaken oaths are void. For example, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi both took an oath that their teacher said something, and their oaths clearly contradicted. When it was found out that one of them was correct and supported by others, the oath was still not false because, as far as the other one could ascertain, he believed to be telling the truth.

Art: Peasants preparing food in a courtyard by North-Italian School

Nedarim 25 – Tricks when taking an oath

Just as one can make a vow to motivate his friend to eat with him, and the vow won't be binding since he only meant it for friendly coercion, so one can take a similar oath, which will be no oath at all, and he won't violate a prohibition of swearing falsely.

For example, one can say, “I swear, and let all the fruit of this world be prohibited to me if I have not seen on the road as many as pilgrims going to Jerusalem!”

But perhaps he saw ants and called them “pilgrims,” and is thus swearing truly!? – No, that cannot be because anyone who takes an oath does so on ordinary people's understanding of words, not on his terms.

But if so, why do the standard formulas mention “swear on our understanding, not on yours?” – That is to prevent incidents like the following. One person was going to swear that he returned the money to his fellow, who left it for safekeeping. He put the coins in a walking stick, asked the depositor to hold the stick while he himself was holding the Torah scroll, and swore that he returned the money and that it was in the depositor's hands. At which the depositor became so infuriated that the broke the stick, the money fell out, and it came out that man swore truly.

But did not Moses himself say, “Keep in mind that you swear today to observe the Torah and do this on mine and God's understanding of this?” The Talmud then discusses all possible ways Moses could have put this into the oath to make the contract unbreakable but finds ways to misinterpret them and get out from under the obligation. In the end, the Talmud finds unbreakable verbiage, which is more complex, so it tells that Moses just used the shortest way.

Art :An Old Woman Weighing Gold Coins by Rembrandt School

Nedarim 24 – Should one say “Kol Nidre?”

On the previous page, the teacher hid his advice while giving it. Although one can annul all his vows for the upcoming year by saying "Kol Nidre," the teacher left it unsaid, and only special people knew through careful reading what he meant. One Sage wanted to publicize the device, but Rava rebuked him: the teacher hid it, and you want to reveal it!?

Talmud also wants to know whether other Sages agreed with this teacher (Rabbi Elazar ben Yaakov). After multiple unsuccessful attempts, it finds clear proof that other Sages disagreed. Yet, the law follows Rabbi Elazar ben Yakov, and the annulment of all vows at the beginning of the year is permitted.

We saw that when one presses his friend to accept an invitation and even vows to forbid something should the friend not accept, such a vow is not taken seriously – it is just a matter of speech, designed as motivation to accept.

There is another similar category: if one says that he just saw as many people on the road as those that went to Jerusalem, that is, 600,000, and if not, he is taking a vow to forbid himself something, this is just an exaggeration, and the vows does not need annulment by the Sage. A similar vow will be if he says, "I just saw a snake like a beam of a vine press!"

Art: Invitation to Dance by Peter Baumgartner

Nedarim 23 – Kol Nidre

Rabbi Elazar ben Yakov spoke little, but whatever he said became accepted. He gave the following advice: one who wants to press his friend to eat with him should say, "Any vows that I will make will be void," and then tell his friend, "I vow that you will eat with me."

But this could not be: once his friend hears the annulment, he will pay no attention to his vow and surely won't eat with him!

Instead, Rabbi Elazar was hiding something. This is what he meant: if one uses a vow to press his friend to eat with him, then this is just a vow to create motivation, which is automatically invalid. On a different theme, if one wants his vows for the coming year to be ineffective, he should stand up at the beginning of the year, on Rosh Hashana, and say thus: "All vows (Kol Nidre) that I will vow throughout the year should be void!" Then, when he, later on makes a vow, it is void, provided that he remembers his initial stipulation.

But no, just the opposite; if he remembers, why is he making a vow now? – it is to overturn it! Instead, he should NOT remember, and his vow is null and void, according to his "Kol Nidre" declaration.

Art: A Seated Young Boy Eating Soup by  Giacomo Francesco Cipper

Nedarim 13 – Vow legalese

The Torah said, "One who vows a vow..." – why did it have to repeat the word? To teach us that if one connects his vow to some other prohibited thing, this thing must become prohibited through a declaration and not be already prohibited. For example, he can say, "This is like a sacrifice to me," because an animal is not born a sacrifice, but rather someone designates it so. If he says, by contrast, "This is like a firstborn (animal) to me," then no vow is created because a firstborn becomes consecrated as a sacrifice at birth by itself. Some make exceptions only for the firstborn, but the rule holds true otherwise.

Another essential rule to remember: vows are valid only for material objects. For example, one cannot say, "I vow not to talk to you," but he can say, "I vow for my mouth not to talk to you."

Art: Funeral of Firstborn by Nikolai Aleksandrovich Yaroshenko

Nedarim 12 – This to me is like that!

One does not have to say the words "I vow." He can instead say, "This, to me, is like that." For example, if he says, "This bread to me is like the meat of a disqualified offering," – he is then forbidden to eat this bread.

Rami bar Chama asked a question: if one says, "This bread to me is like the meat of a peace offering," – what happens then? For most of the lifetime of the peace offering, it is prohibited to eat, so maybe his vow takes effect. But in the end, after its blood has been thrown on the Altar, the meat is eaten by people and guests, so maybe he meant this permitted state, and therefore the vow effects no prohibition?

The Talmud tries to compare this case to various others, where the answer is known but still does not come with a resolution.

Art: Entertaining the Guests by Pieter Gerardus Sjamaar

Nedarim 11 – You are not kosher to me!

One can use the language of “not kosher” to create a vow. For example, if one says, “It is not kosher what I eat of yours!” – he has, in fact, forbidden himself the food coming from his fellow, and it would be counted as if he violated the Torah if he did eat it.

He can also say, “It is not regular (chulin) food,” “not clean,” or “like the remainder of a sacrifice” (which can not be eaten).

However, watch for provisos and caveats: if one says, “It is not kosher what I do not eat of yours,” then he means that what he does NOT eat will be not kosher, but what he DOES eat will be kosher, and thus he created no vow and no prohibition.

Art: Girl Eating an Apple by Godfried Schalcken

Nedarim 10 – Should one ever vow?

In general, one should avoid making vows simply because he may transgress them. Better do something good without a promise, or at least promise right before the deed. For this reason, a Nazir is called “a transgressor” - because he abstains from wine, which is wrong. Now, if just for not drinking wine one is called a sinner, how much more so is one who afflicts himself with unnecessary deprivations and fasts.

If one does decide to make a vow, he has a choice of many words to use, “konam,” “konach,” “konas.” These were created by the Sages so that one should not use the word “korban” (sacrifice). But why not use the word “korban?” – Because he may say, “Korban to God.” But let him say that! – Because he may say just “To God,” thus using the name of God for no purpose. This all is the view of Resh Lakish.

However, Rabbi Yochanan says these terms translate the word “korban” into foreign languages. These words are adequate only if the user or those around him understand this language.

Art: A Domestic Affliction by Benjamin West

Nedarim 9 – Careless people

If one says, “Like the vows of the careless people,” - with this statement, he has effected a vow and must now abide by its conditions. Careless people were swift to make vows or swear, in anger or just to convince, and this man, disapproving of them, still followed their example. This is an incomplete vow, which nevertheless takes effect.

But this vow is too incomplete, he in fact said nothing binding! – Really, he then added, “on me.” But what precisely is his vow? What limitation did he put upon himself! – A Nazir was passing in front of him, or he added, “Of this, I will not eat.”

If he has specified so much, what new information has the teacher told us? Of course, the vow should work! – Well, although he did not enunciate, “I hereby take a vow,” his declaration of “Like the vows of the careless” still took effect.

If he said, “Like the vows of the righteous,” it is as if he has not said anything because the righteous don't make vows. However, if he said, “Like their free-will offerings,” he should follow a good example of the righteous and do what he promised.

King Solomon said, “Better not vow at all than vow and not pay.” What about one who vows and does pay? Some say that it is still better not to vow at all, but some – say that vowing and fulfilling the vow is better than anything.

Art: Rienzi Vowing to Obtain Justice by William Holman Hunt

Nedarim 8 – Good advice from Rav Gidel

The last piece of advice we learned on the previous page came from Rav Gidel (in the name of Rav). Let us see some more of Rav Gidel's advice.

It is commendable to take an oath to do a mitzvah. Even though one is already under oath to do mitzvot, since the Jewish people have accepted this oath as a whole, it is still OK to do more. We learn it from King David, who said, “I swore, and I will perform Your righteous mitzvot.”

He also said that one who saw in a dream himself being excommunicated should find ten scholars to lift the ban from him. These should be people able to reason, not just retell the laws. But if one can't find such scholars, those who know the law will also do. And if one cannot find even these, he should sit on the crossroad and greet every person with “Peace be unto you.” After ten passersby return his greeting with “Peace unto you,” his ban is lifted.

Art: King David by Gustave Moreau

Nedarim 7 – I am excommunicated from you!

Having discussed vague declarations of vows for charity (corner of the field) and an equally vague designation of a lavatory – and left without an answer to both – the Talmud comes to another rule, about a man to told his fellow, “I am excommunicated from you!”

Rabbi Akiva struggled with this case, and even though he might rule stringently and maintain that this creates a vow, he still remained in doubt. This meant that there would be no punishment for violating such vow. Most of the time, when people use the word “excommunicate,” they mean a religious disciplinary measure, not a vow to abstain from dealing with one's fellow.

Incidentally, a Sage who hears bad words from his fellow should excommunicate him. But it is not appropriate for a Sage to excommunicate anybody, so what is he to do? – He should then annul his excommunication. Or, he can be like Mar Zutra, who would first excommunicate himself and then the student when he needed to excommunicate one of his students. On coming home, he would annul excommunication for himself and then for the student.

Art: Before vows by Vasily Perov

Nedarim 6 – Never mind what I said

Rava said that one needs to spell everything in a contract or statement, while Abaye says we understand what is meant. But this is the same as Rabbi Yehudah and his opponents argued about Get, where Rabbi Yehudah required a complete formula of "this is for you the document of removal, etc."

Why would Rava and Abaye, who lived later, argue about the same question? They could just take sides! Rava would be on the side of Rabbi Yehudah and Abaye – his opponents. No! Abaye will say that even Rabbi Yehudah agrees with him, like so: Rabbi Yehudah required the complete formula only for Get, which should be a complete separation between the husband and wife, but in other cases, he too would say that we understand what is meant, precisely as Abaye!

However, later on, we find a refutation for Abaye: in another teaching, even in general, someone required all the details spelled out, and Abaye had to admit it was Rabbi Yehudah. So how could he previously say that everybody agrees with him, and now – that some disagree!? – Abaye changed his mind and admitted that Rabbi Yehudah was always strict and never agreed with Abaye's point that we understand things from the context.

Here is an interesting question: can one do a vague Kiddushin? Can he say to one woman, "You are hereby consecrated to me," and to another one - "And you..." Does he mean "And you too," or "You should consider the possibility"? This was left unresolved.

Art: Portrait of a Gentleman and his Wife in a Park by John Downman