Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Yevamot 24 – He does not know whom he married

If a man betrothed one of two sisters but does not know which of them he betrothed – he needs to give a divorce (Get) to each one. He cannot live with any one of them – because perhaps he betrothed the other one, and this one is prohibited to him as his wife's sister.

If he dies before divorcing, his brother performs a chalitzah with both – on the eventuality that each can be his brother's wife.

If he had two brothers, then one must do a chalitzah with one, but the other brother can marry the other sister. This is permitted according to both possibilities: if her sister, who got the chalitzah, was really the wife – then the bond is now dissolved, and he can marry the other sister. And if her sister was not the true wife, then the chalitzah meant nothing, and the brother is now marrying his deceased brother's wife, that is, doing a yibum.

However, they cannot both marry, each one to a sister. The one who marries the true wife is doing a yibum, and that is fine. But the other one – he is marrying a woman to whom there is a yibum-bond, something we discussed earlier. Still, if they don't consult and just go ahead and marry, they can stay married – because each one can claim that he did the yibum, and it is the other brother who was in violation, and now anyway, the yibum bond is no longer there.

The eldest brother is the one who should do the yibum, but if the younger one has preceded him – he has acquired the mitzvah.

Art: The Cameron Sisters by Stephen Catterson Smith

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Yevamot 23 - Who is a Jew?

Earlier, we mentioned that a child born to a slave woman or a non-Jewish woman is not considered Jewish. As a result, many family laws do not apply. For example, the child is not included in the inheritance rules. If that child is a daughter, then the man's son can marry her after she converts. The Sages later forbade this marriage to avoid confusion.

How do we know this rule? – The Torah said," "Do not intermarry with them... for he will turn your children away from Me, and they will serve other gods" Why did the Torah say "he" and not "she" or" "they?" Because the relationship is not equal. He (the non-Jewish husband of your Jewish daughter) will lead your Jewish children astray. Hence, this is still your child. But she (the non-Jewish wife of your Jewish son) will not lead your Jewish children astray – because they are not considered Jewish, they are not "your" children for the Jewish law.

Can we deduce that in the opposite case, when a non-Jew marries a Jewish woman, the child is entirely kosher? – Not quite. He is not an illegitimate child; he is not a mamzer, but he is blemished: if the child is a daughter, she cannot marry a Kohen.

Art: The most devoted of her slaves by Briton Rivière

Monday, October 27, 2014

Yevamot 22 – Any child

Any son that a man has relieves his wife from the mitzvah of yibum or chalitzah, which she would otherwise have to do after her husband's death. The Torah said that only when "and one of them dies childless" does the mitzvah of yibum apply.

What did the teacher mean by "any child?" He could have said it shorter, "A child." – Even a mamzer – a son born from a woman married to another. But how do we know that? Maybe the Torah discusses only a legitimate son? – From the words "And he has no son," - "U ben ein lo." The term "ein" can be understood as "ain," which would mean an eye, telling us to look into the matter and discover any existing son. For example, if he has a daughter, she also exempts her mother from yibum. The exception to this case is a child born from a slave or a non-Jewish woman, who is not considered the man's offspring for the purposes of Jewish law.

In a similar vein, “any brother” to whom the mitzvah of yibum applies also includes a mamzer. He is also a real brother for burial – so that if the father is a Kohen, and this son of his dies, then other brothers are permitted to go to the cemetery for his burial. This brother also inherits together with the other brothers, and he is liable for cursing his father.

The last point needs explanation. The Torah said, "Do not curse a prince (and anyone in general) in your people," so this prohibition only applies to people who observe Torah laws and do "the conduct of your people." This father sired a mamzer, and he is not doing the right thing, so the son should not be liable for cursing him!? – The father repented. But the mamzer is alive, so the repentance cannot work! – No, it can, because at least now the father behaves appropriately.

Art: Portrait Of A Father And Son by Florentine School

Thursday, October 23, 2014

Yevamot 18 – Bond of yibum

When a brother dies childless, his wife is bound to the other brother: she cannot marry out of the family. The remaining brother either does a yibum (marries her) or gives her a chalitzah (releases her). This bond thus is similar to marriage.

How strong is it? Do we say that it is almost like a marriage that already exists? Take, for example, this case: a woman whose husband died is awaiting a yibum, but then she dies. Can the brother marry this woman's mother? If the brother and the woman were actually married, then, of course, he cannot also marry her mother. But they were never married – they were only connected through a yibum-bond.

Rav Huna says that yes, he can marry her mother. There is no strong connection created by the yibum bond. Now the Talmud begins to analyze the statement. Why didn't Rav Huna simply state, "There is no bond!?" If he did that, we might have thought that even while the woman (yevamah) is still alive, he can disregard the bond and marry her mother. This is not so, however: one is forbidden to destroy the potential for the mitzvah of yibum, and that is what he would have done by marrying the mother.

Rav Yehudah disagrees and says that one cannot marry the mother in this situation. The same question: why didn't Rav Yehudah simply state that "there is a bond?!" – He wants to teach us another lesson. If he said, "There is a bond," we might have thought that it is valid only when there is only one remaining brother, which is why the bond is strong. But should there be many brothers, and the power of the bond be divided among them, then perhaps it would not stop a brother from marrying the woman's mother – so Rav Yehudah had to state this prohibition for all brothers.

Art: Portrait Of The Artists Mother by Franz Marc

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Yevamot 17 – A very young brother

The laws of yibum apply only when two brothers live simultaneously, and one dies childless. However, if the brother is not contemporary, he cannot do a yibum. What do you mean?

There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon, and Reuven dies childless. Shimon should now marry Reuven's wife, but he waits. Meanwhile, a third brother, Levi, is born. Now Shimon marries the widow. He has his own wife also, and now he dies – the two wives are looking at Levy. However, Levy cannot marry the first one because she is his brother's wife, and when Levi was born, Reuven was already not alive. Thus, the first wife goes free and does not need either yibum or chalitzah from Levi. The second wife goes free because of the first one. This is one of the fifteen women of the basic rule, but we treat it in more detail here.

How do we know that the above is true? The Torah said, "If two brothers live together (in the world)" – which means that the two brothers should be contemporaries, and then the laws of yibum apply. If not, the other brother's wife is always forbidden to the young brother.

Incidentally, this phrase also teaches us that it applies only to brothers of the same father – just like the twelve brothers who were the sons of Jacob and are called brothers – so here too, "brothers" should be from the same father.

Art: Jacob Sending his Son Joseph to Look for his Brothers by Eustache Le Sueur

Sunday, October 19, 2014

Yevamot 15 – Did Beit Shammai do it?

Earlier, we learned that a marriage permitted according to Beit Shammai would lead, according to Beit Hillel, to a severe consequence of a child being a mamzer and being forbidden to marry a Jew. Therefore, the question is, did Beit Shammai actually follow their point of view in practice?

One attempt to decide this is by analyzing the story of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who said, "How are we to resolve it? Should we simply agree with Beit Shammai? But the child is mamzer, according to Beit Hillel! And if we simply agree with Beit Hillel – but the child of the marriage they allow is not fit to marry a Kohen, soon we will not have priests! Rather, let's do this: in every such case, let us do a chalitzah, but not a yibum. Since we ban yibum, we will never come into a problem with Beit Hillel: even if they do halitzah, it is meaningless, and so no harm. And according to Beit Shammai, this will also be acceptable because they require either a yibum or chalitzah. However, the Sages never got to vote and put this measure into practice."

Can we deduce from this that Beit Shammai actually acted according to their view? For otherwise, what “previous cases” are we talking about?

Not necessarily! It could be that this measure was not flawless for a different reason. By "previous cases," we mean the cases of Beit Hillel: the husbands who married their wives following the view of Beit Hillel will now observe their wives getting chalitzah from another man, implying that the husband's marriage was illegal until then! This cannot be, for "All the Torah's ways are pleasantness, and all its paths are peace."

Art: Double portrait of a husband and wife by Wolfgang Heimbach

Yevamot 13 – A mitzvah marriage of Beit Hillel is illegitimate for Beit Shammai

Earlier we learned that if a man is forbidden to marry the wife of his deceased brother, if she is his close relative, all other co-wives of this brother are equally forbidden to the man, and no halitzah or yibum is required.

Beit Shammai disagrees with this basic rule and permits one to marry a co-wife of the deceased brother. This leads to many significant consequences. For example, if co-wives perform a halitzah, they are divorcees. They cannot marry a Kohen – that is according to Beit Shammai, but for Beit Hillel, who say that the halitzah was not needed in the first place and means nothing even if performed – they can still marry a Kohen.

More importantly, if a brother of the deceased makes a yibum to his co-wife and marries her, following the opinion of Beit Shammai that this allowed, the children of such marriage will be mamzerim, according to Beit Hillel. Mamzerim are not allowed to marry a Jew, and the child of a mamzer is still a mamzer!

Even though they had such dividing disagreements, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel still maintained a friendly relationship, would intermarry, and relied on each other for purity laws of sacrifices. This is because they trusted each other so that if a situation that is permitted according to one but forbidden to another arose, they knew that they would be honestly informed.

Art: Group portrait of a husband and wife in a drawing-room by Arthur Alfred Davis

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

Yevamot 10 – Case number sixteen

Even though Rabbi Yehudah sharply rebuked Levy for his suggestion, the latter insisted on his understanding and added case number sixteen to the list of women who exempt their co-wives from yibum. Here it is.

Let us say one's mother was legally married to his father (a standard case), but after his father's death, she "married" his brother (from another woman). The "marriage" of his mother and his brother never took legal effect because she was previously married to the brother's father. Therefore, if his brother now dies, there isn't even a suggestion that he should marry his mother in yibum.

However, if his father "violated" his mother – that is, lived with her without getting married – then his brother (his father's son from another woman) can indeed marry his mother. If this brother now dies, our protagonist finds himself in the position of a yibum; but since he cannot marry his mother, she does not get a yibum or chalitzah from him, and his brother's other wives also don't need a yibum or chalitzah. This is precisely the situation of the fifteen cases above, and this is case number sixteen that Levy wanted to include.

If so, why did Rabbi Yehudah disagree? – Because this scenario involves an "if-he-does" case, a prohibited act of son "marrying" his father's former wife, and Rabbi Yehudah claims that such cases which involve a transgression were not included in the basic rule.

Art: Double portrait of a father and son by Jacob Gerritsz. Cuyp

Monday, October 13, 2014

Yevamot 9 – Why only fifteen cases?

Rabbi Yehudah the Prince takes the extra words "to her" and learns a lesson utterly different from our previous one: "to her" refers "to the error (feminine)" that one commits when he worships idols. The exact same words connect the two areas of the law and teach when and what sacrifice one must bring.

Levi asked Rabbi Yehudah the Prince, "Why did the central rule of Yevamot" teach only fifteen cases? It should teach sixteen!" Rabbi Yehudah replied, "It seems like this one has no brains in his head!" But what sixteenth woman could Levy have meant? The Talmud suggests that it may be a daughter of a man who violated a woman and whom his son married – but discards the idea since this case is actually a disagreement, and the rule of fifteen was unanimous. It also suggests many other, much more complicated relationships but discards them all and explains why Rabbi Yehudah would not agree to any such scenario as a sixteenth case.

Also, the phrase "this one has no brains in his head" implies that the answer should be obvious and that Levy should have deduced the answer independently. Thus, the phrase itself carries additional information, and the Talmud discussed what it might be.

Art: Fisherman and his Daughter by Charles Hawthorne

Sunday, October 12, 2014

Yevamot 8 – Brother's wife or wife's sister?

Earlier, we said that if one's brother dies childless, one has to marry his brother's widow or release her through the procedure of "chalitzah." What if she happens to also be his wife's sister? That is, what if two brothers were married to two sisters, and one brother died. Usually, we would say that a man can't marry his wife's sister while his wife is alive. However, perhaps here, since one prohibition is lifted and he has to marry the widow, he can do so even though he will be married to sisters?

Where would we see that "once a prohibition is lifted, other prohibitions are lifted as well?" – In the laws of a metzora (spiritual leper). Usually, a metzora is not allowed to visit the Temple. However, to purify himself, he needs to. And, once he is on the way to do so, he is allowed to disregard other kinds of impurity, such as last night's seminal emission. Should we apply this principle and permit one to marry any close relative if she happens to be in the "yibum" situation with him? – No! To prevent such a possible way of thinking, the Torah added extra words, "to her" – to teach that the wife's sister is prohibited even in the situation of yibum.

Even though the principle of "once a prohibition is lifted, other prohibitions are lifted as well" does not apply here because of the extra words "to her" and also because of other ways of how this prohibition can be derived, it nevertheless finds applications in other areas.

Art: Portrait of the Shishmariov Sisters by Jules Elie Delauney

Monday, October 6, 2014

Yevamot 2 – Sister-in-law

In general, a man is prohibited from marrying his sister-in-law, his brother's wife. However, if his brother dies childless, then it is a mitzvah to marry her (and this is called a "yibum") or to formally allow her to go free (and this is called a "chalitzah").

A unique situation arises when a man cannot marry her for a different reason, such as if she is the man's daughter. And, since he cannot marry his daughter and does not even need a chalitzah, the other wives of the deceased brother are also released without a yibum or chalitzah.

Two things require explanation. How can a man's brother be married to his daughter? Should not such a marriage be prohibited? The answer is that there is no prohibition in the Torah to marry one's niece, but one can't marry his aunt. What about the other wives (co-wives)? How is that allowed? The answer here is that a man is permitted many wives by Torah law. The Talmud lists fifteen close relatives of a man he cannot marry and who are thus automatically released from chalitzah or yibum, together with their co-wives.

Today, one cannot marry many wives, and yibum is not allowed, but the chalitzah is still required.

Art: The Two Sisters by August Andreas Jerndorff

Sunday, October 5, 2014

Chagigah 27 – During Festivals, all Israel are trusted friends

We mentioned (and this is for the last time in this Tractate) that ignorant people, who are not knowledgeable in the laws of ritual purity, cannot be trusted about it: their garments and vessels are considered impure. However, at the Festivals, this changes, and all are treated as trusted friends ("chaverim"). This is based on the phrase "And all Israel gathered to the city as one, and they were friends" ("chaverim"). and on the custom of all Jews to purify themselves and their utensils for the Festivals.

Because of this unity, one can open a new barrel of wine for sale. It will be considered ritually pure, even though everybody touches it, including ignorant people. He can even finish selling this wine after the holidays – for otherwise, he would refrain from opening it – in Rabbi Yehudah's opinion. However, the Sages don't go that far, and once the holidays are over, the wine is considered impure. Also, once the Holidays are over, all vessels in the Temple are purified. The two Altars, the copper one and the golden one, are never purified in a mikveh, and people are told to be especially careful and not touch them.

On the subject of Altars, Rabbi Abahu gives proof that the Torah Sages are not subject to the fire of Gehinnom, as follows. A salamander (which is created in a fire burning for seven years) is an offspring of fire, and yet a man who smears himself with its blood becomes immune to fire – then how much more so are the Sages, whose body itself is fire! – following the phase, "Here, my words are like fire, says God."

Resh Lakish takes this further. His proof is from the Golden Altar, which had a very thin golden covering, but the underlying wood would not waste away for hundreds of years. How much more so are even the sinners of Israel, for even they are full of mitzvot as pomegranates (following the Song of Sons, "Like a pomegranate are your temples ("rakateich") which can be understood as "reikatech" - the empty ones among you – who are still full of mitzvot.

Art: Still Life Of Pomegranates Upon A Pewter Dish by Juan De Zurbaran

Saturday, October 4, 2014

Chagigah 26 – Thieves who repented

We learned before that the ignorant people were not trusted about ritual purity. This leads to a problem: since clay vessels are often used for sacrifices, and since after use they becomes "leftovers" (or "notar") and hence must be broken, and furthermore, since no kilns were permitted in the Jerusalem – people could not obtain clay vessels that would be ritually pure. Therefore, the Sages lifted their distrust of the ignorant, but only under specific circumstances: clay vessels manufactured between Jerusalem and Modiin were declared ritually pure. This was only true for craftsmen in Modiin who were heading toward Jerusalem and not for resellers.

If thieves entered a house and stole earthenware vessels but then returned them – they are believed to say "we did not touch the inside," which would preserve the containers for use with sacrifices. This sounds strange. Thieves are usually ignorant of the details of ritual purity, and if they entered a house, we should presume that every room they had the time to reach should have its vessels impure! – These are exceptional thieves: they repented. Thus, they are believed in the purity of sacrifices also.

Art: The fruit thief by Jean Raoux

Friday, October 3, 2014

Chagigah 25 – Loopholes for the ignorant

We mentioned the five levels of holiness, one stricter than the other. However, we also said that this is sometimes lifted for the sake of the ignorant populace.

For example, when an ignorant farmer brings oil or wine for his sacrifices, they are accepted, even though the vessels in which he brings them are most likely ritually impure. The law is lifted for the following reason: if the ignorant were excluded, they might build their own Temple. There was also a hope that they will be influence by the Temple's holiness for the good. This, however, is a loophole, and to avail of it, the consecration of the wine or oil must occur before the pressing, since this leads the farmer to purify his vessels first.

By contrast, there is no such danger in not accepting a priestly portion (terumah) from them – the ignorant will give it instead to another Kohen, his friend, who is just as ignorant of the law of purity as the giver. Thus, the laws of terumah are stricter here. And yet, this same terumah may be accepted from the ignorant at the general time of wine pressing. This is because knowledgeable people usually supervise the purification of all vessels for harvesting and pressing, and the priests can rely on that. The Sages also did not want the scholarly priest to be entirely left without the priestly portion.

Art: The fine wine by French School

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

Chagigah 22 – Enmity of the ignorant

Knowledgeable people (called "chaverim," or trusted friends) are subject to fewer regulations than the ignorant (called "am haaretz," or the "people of the land.”) For example, the additional precautions regarding purifying vessels in a mikveh apply only to the ignorant. However, this does not go well with the ignorant and causes their enmity toward the learned.

Here is an example. Holy objects are accepted for sacrifice from the ignorant in the hope that they did prepare them in purity. However, the priest's portion, "terumah," is not accepted by the knowledgeable priests because perhaps the ignorant made it impure by mistake, and it would be forbidden to eat it. This seems illogical. If anything, we should not believe the ignorant about the priest's portion, which is less strict, and not on sacrifices!

Look at consequences, though. If a knowledgeable priest refuses to accept a portion from an ignorant, then the ignorant will be upset, but at worst, he will now go and give his unrequited portion to his ignorant friend priest. However, if the priests do not accept his items for sacrifices, he may go and build himself another Temple – therefore, they accept his oil and wine, presuming them to be pure.

Rabbi Yehoshua could not understand some of the opinions of Beit Shammai regarding ritual purity, and he exclaimed, "You should be ashamed of yourself, the (already dead) Sages of Beit Shammai!" One of the students explained to him the reason related above, about ignorant people not accepting that their utensils were impure, and thus elucidated the logic." As a result, Rabbi Yehoshua fasted many days until his teeth blackened, since he has offended the memory of the Sages wrongly, and Beit Hillel changed their rulings to agree with those of Beit Shammai."

Art: A Barn Interior With A Still Life Of Kitchen Utensils And An Owl, Two Men Beside A Fire Beyond By David The Younger Ryckaert