Yevamot 87 – Marriages, births, deaths

A Jewish woman who marries a Kohen becomes part of his family and, since she is his "acquisition" as a wife, can eat the priest's portion of the crop, or "terumah." Let's look at the possible metamorphoses that she can later go through.

If her husband the Kohen dies, but she has a child from him, she can continue to eat terumah, as if her husband was still alive. If she then marries a Levi, she may eat Levi's due from the crop – that is, first tithe (“maasar”) but she can't eat terumah any longer.

Here was can note that the author of this ruling is Rabbi Meir, who forbids the first tithe to a non-Levi.

If her husband the Levi dies but she has a child from him, she can still eat maaser. If then she marries a regular Israel, she may not eat either maaser or terumah. If her husband the Israel dies but she has a child from him, she still cannot eat either maaser or terumah.

If her son from Israel dies, she can again eat maaser because of her son, a Levi. If her son from a Levi dies, she can now eat terumah because of her son, who is a Kohen. And if that son dies, she again cannot eat either maaser or terumah.

Art: Portrait of the Artist's Wife by Tadeusz Pruszkowski

Yevamot 86 – Who gets the tithe?

The priestly portion (terumah) goes to the Kohanim, and the tithe (maaser rishon) goes to the Levites – these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. What is his logic? – The Torah said, "Speak to the Levites and say to them, 'When you take … tithe.'"

However, Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says that the tithe goes to the Kohanim. How could he exclude the Levites altogether? – He didn't; he meant "Also to the Kohanim." And what is his logic? – There are twenty-four places where the Kohanim are called Levites because they, in fact, come from the same family: Aaron, the progenitor of all the Kohanim, comes from the tribe of Levy.

If so, how can Rabbi Akiva argue that the tithe should not be given to the Kohanim? – He says that the tithe is unique because one can eat it "anywhere," whereas the Kohen cannot eat it in a cemetery – because he cannot go to the cemetery at all! What would Rabbi Elazar answer now? – He says this teaches a different law, namely, that the tithe can be eaten in any state, even being ritually impure.

Later, when the Second Temple was being built, the Sages penalized the Levites, took the tithe away from them, and gave it to the Kohanim – because the Levites did not come back to build the Temple; some say it was done for the benefit of poor Kohanim.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah had a garden from which he collected the tithe. Rabbi Akiva turned the garden's entrance into a cemetery so that Rabbi Elazar (who was a Kohen) would be prevented from taking the tithe. Rabbi Elazar said, "Akiva is with his shepherd's sack, but I will survive anyway." (He was very wealthy).

Art: Old Cemetery Tower At Nuenen by Vincent Van Gogh

Yevamot 84 – All possible cases of yibum

Based on previous discussions, Talmud formulates a rule: a woman may be permitted to her husband but forbidden to her brother-in-law, a.k.a. yavam; she may be permitted to the yavam but not to the husband; she may be permitted to both; she may be forbidden to both. How?

For example, consider if a woman was a widow and a regular Kohen married her, but his brother was a High Priest. The brother would not be allowed to do a yibum – since a High Priest should not marry a widow – and thus, she is permitted to her husband but not to the yavam.

A non-trivial example of the second category is this. A regular Israel married an illegitimate woman (mamzeret). He has a brother who is himself a mamzer. An ordinary Israel cannot marry a mamzeret, but a mamzer can. Thus, we have a case of a woman who is forbidden to her husband but is permitted to her yavam.

A new example: a High Priest married a widow. This was a prohibited marriage, so the woman became disqualified (chalalah). Now she cannot marry any Kohen, not because she is a widow, but because she is a chalalah. This is a situation where she is forbidden both to her husband and her yavam.

The fourth category includes all other combinations, even though the Talmud finds cases that are not listed in the first three categories and do not belong to the fourth, which means that the examples lists are not exhaustive.

Art: The Widower by James Jacques Joseph Tissot

Yevamot 83 – The laws of Rabbi Yose

Rabbi Yose did not say much, but when he did, the law usually followed him. Rav mentioned two such cases: androgyne and grafting, and Shmuel mentioned another two: a woman in labor and rendering unfit. Let's look at some of them.

Earlier, we saw that an androgyne has the status of a male for the purpose of another male marrying him – the disagreement was whether one is liable for relations with him only through his male orifice (anus) or also his female orifice. However, Rabbi Yose states that an androgyne is considered a separate creature, and the Sages were not sure whether to give him the status of a male. As a result, none of the laws requiring definite proof of him being a male can be applied.

Grafting: one may not plant a tree or graft a branch to a tree on a Shmita year, and even some time before it. Rabbi Yose said that this “some time” was two weeks, and another period of thirty days was already implied, so that total according to him was thirty days and two weeks.

Rendering unfit: one should not plant wheat in a vineyard, so if one spreads his vines over someone else's grain, he has created a prohibition, and the crop from the overhanging must be burned. One who does it is liable to compensate the owner. However, Rabbi Yose (together with Rabbi Shimon) says that one cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him. Thus, no prohibition is created, and there is no need to burn and repay.

Art: Hay And Wheat Stooks Before The Rain by Edward Duncan

Yevamot 82 – Things that are always counted

Earlier we saw that an androgynous Kohen is considered a male, to the point that his marriage to a woman qualifies her to eat the priest's portion of grain. Rabbi Yochanan says that this designation of him as a male is definite, because otherwise he would not be giving his wife the right to eat the priest's portion, for which a regular person is liable to death by the hand of Heaven. This logic is valid, because the laws of priest's portion (terumah) are valid even today, when there is diaspora.

However, Resh Lakish disagrees about precisely this point: the priest's portion is just a reminder that the Sages have established for the future time, when it will be reinstated, at the in-gathering of the exiles. Then how is the wife of an androgynous Kohen allowed to eat terumah? – Because the terumah itself is only a decree of the Sages. As part of their enactment, they allowed her to eat terumah. Resh Lakish then regards the designation of an androgyne as a male as only a possibility.

This disagreement is rooted in another, about the wording in the "things that are counted" rule. What is this rule? Some versions say that "all things that are counted" are included in the laws of nullification – that is, things that are sometimes counted and sometimes weighted, like a sliver of meat. Other versions insist on "only things that are counted," including only such things as cabbage stalks. In Israel, they grew as big as small trees and were always counted, never weighed. This disagreement is the root of the laws of nullification of terumah and for the controversies listed above.

Art: Still-life with Quince, Cabbage, Melon, and Cucumber by Juan Sanchez Cotan

Yevamot 81 – A sterile Kohen

A Kohen who is sterile, either from birth or due to an illness, can nevertheless marry a woman, and this marriage entitles her to eat the priest's portion (terumah). By contrast, if he is sterile because of physical damage to his reproductive organs, he is prohibited from marrying into the congregation of Israel. Therefore, if he was previously married, he now needs to divorce, and if, in the interim, he has a cohabitation with his wife, she would lose the right to eat the priest's portion – even if she had it because she was a daughter of a Kohen.

A Kohen who is an androgyne can marry a woman, and that marriage entitles her to eat the priest's portion. That is because an androgyne is classified as a definite male – this is the opinion of Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon. However, they did not clarify if they were entirely sure of a "definite male" designation or if it was an "also a definite male." Accordingly, this leads to a disagreement about whether the priest's portion law is active nowadays or is it only a law that the Sages left as a reminder for the future when the priest's portion will return.

Art: Married Couple in a Garden by Frans Hals

Yevamot 77 – Was David legitimate?

We mentioned that a female convert from the nation of Moav may marry into the congregation of Israel. This had direct relevance to King David's provenance.

When Shaul offered his armor to David to fight Goliath, he noticed how it miraculously shrank to fit David's size. He then ordered Avner to ask who David's father was. But everyone knew David's father because he had six hundred thousand people (students) at his command! Instead, he was asking if David was from Peretz, fit to be a king, or from Zerach – just a noble.

Here Doeg intervened and said that they should rather inquire about David's legitimacy altogether, for he came from Ruth, the princess of the people of Moav. Avner defended David: only male converts from Amon have a problem. Doeg countered: then only a male mamzer has a problem, but not female! They kept analyzing the reasons, but Doeg, who was very smart, cornered Avner, who then went to a central yeshiva for support. There, too, Doeg was victorious with his logic.

At this point, Yeter intervened. He girded himself with a sword and said that whoever does not accept the law of female converts from Moav being legitimate would be killed with this sword. However, he also added that he has heard this law from Shmuel the Prophet. He was believed. But why? Wasn't he in the heat of the argument and therefore suspect of lying? – Because Shmuel and his court were alive, and this rule could have been easily verified.

Art: The Cavalier's Sword by William A. Breakspeare

Yevamot 76 – The congregation of Israel

We mentioned earlier that one who has his testicles wounded or crushed and one whose member is severed cannot "enter the congregation of Israel," He cannot marry a Jewish woman born as a Jew. However, he can marry a convert. Although converts are Jewish in every respect, they are not encompassed by the term "congregation." Their children, however, will be called "congregation."

Rabbi Yehudah has another view, according to which converts are also included in the "congregation," and accordingly, our man discussed above cannot marry anyone. The source for this law is found in the Torah here.

Similarly, a convert from the people of Amon or Moav is prohibited from marrying into the congregation. This was only true when these peoples lived as separate nations. After king Sennacherib expanded his empire and resettled entire peoples, they all got mixed, and the law stopped being applicable. Even when relevant, only male converts had the prohibition, but not females, since the Torah formulated the ban in terms of "Moavi" - which implies the male, but not "Moaviyah," which would indicate a woman.

Art: The Dead Sea with the mountains of Moab by Gustave Bauernfeind

Yevamot 70 – An uncircumcised Kohen

Generally, a Kohen and his family can eat the priestly portion of the grain (terumah), separated by Jews in the Land of Israel. This is also true for slaves that he acquires. However, if this Kohen is uncircumcised or ritually impure, he cannot eat terumah. This does not change his family's status, and they can continue to eat terumah just as they did before - because they are still his family and did not change in any way.

When a Kohen is uncircumcised, we are not talking about a willful violator because the Talmud usually does not speak about violators. Instead, his two older brothers have previously died due to circumcision, which left him with the presumption that circumcision is dangerous to his health and should not be done. Still, when he becomes healthy, and experts assess this, the mitzvah of circumcision is again incumbent on him.

The situation is reversed for a Kohen who has wounded or crushed testicles or whose member is severed. He is prohibited from marrying and cohabiting with a Jewish woman, but this does not take away his status as a Kohen. Therefore, he may still eat terumah. However, his wife is different: once he cohabits with her, she loses the right to terumah because she had cohabitation with someone unfit for her.

Art: Self Portrait with Father and Brother by John Hamilton Mortimer

Yevamot 65 – Claiming a refund

If a woman was married to someone for ten years and divorced because she had no children, then she is entitled to the full Ketubah (divorce settlement) because it is presumed that it is the husband's fault, as we learned before. If that happens the second time, then on the third time, the presumption changes, and, since three times is considered an established rule, she is established as not being able to have children. The third husband can divorce her without a Ketubah payment. Can the previous husband now claim a refund of his earlier Ketubah payment? No, for she can claim, “It is only now that I have grown weak, but it was your fault before.”

If she was then married the fourth time and had children, can she claim the Ketubah from the third husband? – Here, we apply the rule, “Your silence is better than your speech.” He can counterclaim and say, “Had I known that you were fertile, I would never divorce you. So it was not a divorce, and you are still married to me, and your new children are mamzerim.” However, the court can say, “Even if she is silent if that is the truth, then we must act!” Instead, the correct claim is that it is only now that she became healthy and fertile, but at the time of divorce, she was unable to conceive, and therefore the third husband is not liable to pay.

We implied that it is the man's obligation to procreate. Why? The Torah said, “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it,” talking to men who, in general, engage in battles and conquer. Another opinion is that both men and women have this mitzvah because the word “Be fruitful (p'ru)” is plural imperative. What does the first one answer? The term “conquer” is missing a letter “u” in the way it is written and can be read in the singular.

Art: A Family Resting Before A House, With A Mother Silencing Her Husband Sleeps by Abraham Willemsens

Yevamot 64 – Ten years without children

If a man was married to a woman for ten years and did not have any children, in the times of the Talmud, he would have to divorce her or marry another wife to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation. This is only true if he did not have children before. It also assumes that they don't know who is at fault. However, if the man is sterile, there is no point in him divorcing her since he cannot have children with anybody else anyway. After he divorces her, she has no presumption of not being able to have children, and when she marries another man, the new husband needs to also count ten years before applying the rule above.

In deciding whether she gets the payment of Ketubah, the question of whose fault it was coming up again. Here the blame is assigned to the man: since the mitzvah of procreation is on him, it is assumed that not being to have children is his fault – in the absence of any other indicators – and therefore, she, not being at fault, is entitled to full payment of her Ketubah.

Art: Family with a Bird by Bartolome Esteban Murillo

Yevamot 63 – Man must have children

A few teachings of Rabbi Elazar about a man and his wife: one who does not have a wife is not a whole man because "God created them male and female, and called their name Man;" a wife is called "helper against him" – if he deserves, she is a helper, if not – she is against him; "God brought her to Adam, and Adam said, "this time it is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh" teaches that Adam has approached every animal, but his mind was pacified only with Eve.

As Rav was leaving Rabbi Chiya, Rabbi Chiya asked him, "What is worse than death?" Rav searched for the answer and found it, "I found – bitter than death – a bad wife." Rabbi Chiya intended to save Rav from a bad wife, but his prayer was unsuccessful, and Rav's wife used to aggravate him, cooking the opposite of what he asked. Rav's son, Chiya, started reversing Rav's requests so that when the wife cooked a different dish, Rav would get precisely what he wanted. Rav said, "Your mother has improved her ways!" Chiya confessed that he was reversing orders. Rav said, "I could have learned from you! And yet, it is not good to say a lie."

A teaching of Ben Sira: "A beautiful wife – happy is her husband, the number of his days is doubled."

The Messiah will only come when all the souls initially present in Adam will have a chance to be born. Accordingly, one who does not engage in procreation is considered as spilling blood and diminishing God's image.

Art: A Portrait Of Nobleman With His Wife And Two Children by Johann Hulsman

Yevamot 62 – How many children must a man have?

A man is obligated to fulfill the commandment to be fruitful and multiply. How many children are sufficient? – Two sons – these are the words of Beit Shammai. What is their logic? Moses had two sons, and after that, he abstained from having relations with his wife. However, Beit Hillel says that a man must have a son and a daughter. Why? – Just like God created a male and a female, so is this mitzvah. Incidentally, all agree that it is not proper for a man to be without a wife, even if he has fulfilled the obligation to be fruitful, because the Torah said, "It's not good for a man to be alone."

Why don't Beit Shammai learn from the world's creation, just as Beit Hillel does? – They answer that there it was impossible to do otherwise: Eve had to be created so that Adam could have a wife; however, in our context, if a man has two sons, there are many women in the world that they can marry.

Then why don't Beit Hillel learn from the life of Moses, as Beit Shammai does? – They answer that Moses' situation was unique, and he separated from his wife of the accord. What was his logic? He reasoned thus: if the children of Israel, with whom God spoke only one time while giving the Torah, had to stay away from their wives, then I (Moses), with whom God speaks at all times, how much more so I have to stay away from my wife? – and God later agreed with him, saying, "Tell them to go back to their houses (wives)," which we understand to imply, "But you are correct in staying here with Me."

Actually, there were three cases where Moses did things on his own accord, and God later agreed. Another one was breaking the Tablets. Moses reasoned: if the Passover offerings – which is only one commandment in the Torah – are forbidden to one who is “estranged” from the Torah, then the whole Torah is, of course, forbidden to the Jews who worship a Golden Calf. God later agreed, saying, "Tablets, which you broke." The word "which," "asher," can be understood as "yasher koach" – correct that you did it.

Art: Mrs. Arthur Knowles and her Two Sons by John Singer Sargent

Yevamot 61 – Whom the High Priest can marry

A Kohen may not marry a woman who converted to Judaism. However, Rabbi Shimon, who usually understands and ascribes reasons for the laws of the Torah, says that the logic here is that a convert may have had relations with someone prohibited to her. Therefore, if a girl converts before the age of three, her cohabitation - even if she is violated - does not carry the disqualification power of an adult, and she can marry a Kohen.

Another lenient law from Rabbi Shimon: an idolater's grave does not spread ritual impurity under a roof, so that a person in this situation remains pure. Why? – The Torah said, “Man (Adam), when he dies under a roof...transmits impurity.” And only Jews are called “Adam,” because their souls all come from reincarnations of Adam's soul – which is not true for idolaters.

If a Kohen betrothed a widow (whom he is allowed to marry) and was appointed a High Priest, he could fully marry her (which would not be allowed for a regular High Priest). This is learned from the words “... only a virgin shall he take,” where the words “shall he take” are extra, alluding to a particular case where he marries a widow.

This situation happened with Yehoshua ben Gamla, who betrothed a widow, Martha, daughter of Baitos, who was then appointed High Priest but proceeded with marriage. In fact, Martha was influential in his appointment: she bought High Priest's place for her husband with many, many pounds of gold coins. But in the end, Yehoshua restored Torah study and is remembered for good, as we have learned elsewhere.

Art: A Marriage Portrait by Pieter de Grebber

Yevamot 59 – Wife for a High Priest

A High Priest has stricter requirements in the choice of this wife than a regular Kohen: not only he cannot marry a divorcee, but he can also not marry a widow, whether she was only engaged or actually married, or a mature girl. The Torah said, “He will take a wife in her virginity.” This is to emphasize initial virginity, at the age between twelve to twelve-and-half. However, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon allow him to marry a girl older that that.

What is their respective logic? The first teacher (Rabbi Meir) interprets “her virginity” to strictly emphasize this initial maturity. However, the extra word “in” relaxes the law and tells us that only natural cohabitation makes her ineligible for the High Priest, but unnatural (anal) does not disqualify her.

On the other hand, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon understand “virginity” as already denoting complete virginity. Then the next word “her virginity” relaxes the law and allows more mature age. Therefore, the third word, “in,” again makes the law stricter and requires all her virginity to be extant, excluding unnatural (anal) intercourse, which accordingly disqualifies her.

Today, when there is no Temple and no High Priest, this discussion is largely theoretical.

Art: The Widow by Ramon Casas

Yevamot 58 – What does chuppah accomplish?

Usually, people get engaged and then marry under the chuppah. However, what happens when they do the chuppah without prior engagement and when they really should not get married, such as when a High Priest is marrying a widow. After this forbidden marriage, she would lose the privileges of a Kohen's daughter (if she had them). Rav says: this chuppah is not legally significant since there is a possibility that they will realize the wrongdoing and stop themselves. However, Shmuel says that the chuppah is too close to the transgression, and she has lost the privileges already.

Rav Sheshet elucidated this disagreement from a seemingly unrelated ruling about a suspected wife. When she says, “Amen, amen,” she tells the truth now and has never lied in other situations. But what different situation could the rule mean? After a few trials, we suggest that she was engaged, then hid with another man, then had a chuppah with the first one. But that is similar to our situation: he is forbidden to live with her until the case is cleared, and they had a chuppah but did not live together. It could have been a brilliant resolution, but the Talmud asserts that the ruling itself is transmitted incorrectly and cannot serve as any proof. The question remains unresolved.

Art: The Wedding Dress by George Goodwin Kilburne

Yevamot 56 – What is legally considered an act of cohabitation?

We mentioned that to effect yibum and acquire his yevama as a wife, one's beginning of cohabitation is sufficient. The same applies to being liable for cohabitation with any woman who is prohibited to him. But what is considered the beginning of cohabitation?

Shmuel says this is the contact (literally, "kiss") of the genitals. He brings an analogy: imagine a man who places his finger on his mouth; it is impossible not to push the flesh of his lips. In other words, Shmuel agrees that a minimal degree of penetration is required, but he argues that it is inevitably achieved by contact.

However, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, they brought another opinion: insertion of the corona constitutes the beginning of cohabitation, with all the legal consequences. What is then considered the completion of the act? – Insertion of the part of the member beyond the corona. What about the emission of seed? – Many say that it is legally not required. What about the "emission of seed" mentioned by the Torah? – they say that the situation should be fit to emit it, but not really do it.

And for what things does he acquire his yevama? – If he is a Kohen, she can already eat Kohen's portion (terumah), which is ordinarily permitted only to Kohen's family. He inherits his brother. He can annul her vows and bury her – which is ordinarily prohibited to a Kohen for anybody but his close relatives.

Art: A Couple Sitting At A Table In An Inn by (after) Jacob Toorenvliet

Yevamot 54 – Erection is a state of mind

One who decides to do a yibum – to cohabit with his deceased brother's wife (“yevamah”) – can do it in any of the following ways. Whether done willingly for a mitzvah or by coercion or by mistake, whether he only begins the act or completes it, and whether it is natural or anal intercourse – it makes no difference, and he acquires her as a wife.

How can a man be coerced? Could it be that idolaters forced him? – No, this explanation won't stand: since his member was erect, it must be that he found the situation somewhat desirable and was, therefore, a willing participant. (This rule is called “Erection is a state of mind.”) Can we suggest that he was sleeping? – No, for then he lacks the intelligence to affect the legal acquisition. Can we then suggest he was on a roof with an erection for his wife, fell off the roof, and accidentally inserted it into his yevamah? – That too does not stand: he may be liable for damages, such as pain and medical bills, but he does not create a yibum. Final conclusion: he had an erection for his wife, and then the brother's wife seized him and cohabited with him.

Incidentally, if a man intends to insert his member into a wall and accidentally inserts it in his yevamah, he has not acquired her as a wife since his intention was not for cohabitation; however, if he intended to insert it into an animal, and inserted it into his yevamah, he has acquired her, because an act with an animal is considered a form of cohabitation.

Art: The Sisters by George Baxter

Yevamot 52 – Get, Yibum, Chalitzah

What are the possible permutations of marriages and divorces and yibum and chalitzah? If one declared the intent to marry his deceased brother's wife but then changed his mind and gave her a Get (divorce document), the Get alone is not enough. The Torah law dictates either a yibum or a chalitzah in this case. Therefore,  he needs to also give her a chalitzah.

If one stated that he would marry the widow (this is called "maamar" and looks like an engagement) and then cohabited with her – this is the proper way of doing the mitzvah of yibum. Now, that's obvious, isn't it? You might think that since this procedure looks completely like marriage, people may think it is actually a traditional marriage and not a yibum. Therefore, we need to be told that this is the proper order and that people will understand. Note that in practice today, yibum is never done, but rather one performs the chalitzah.

Moreover, one who did not follow the laws of propriety was subject to lashes given by the court. For example, Rav used to order lashes to one who cohabited with his deceased brother's wife without first declaring marriage intent. He also prescribed lashes for one who betroths a woman by cohabitation. Even though cohabitation is the only form of engagement mentioned in the Torah, the Sages decreed additional, preferred forms: money (ring) or a document. Some say Rav only gave lashes in this last case because it is licentious behavior.

Art: The Marriage Contract by Jan Jozef, the Younger Horemans

Yevamot 50 – Divorce, and then another divorce

If a deceased brother left two wives, and the remaining brother gives each one a Get (divorce document), then the second Get has no validity. Really, the Get has no place here; it should be either a yibum (marriage) or a chalitzah, which is akin to divorce. However, if he does give the first wife a Get, and the Get has no effect, then certainly the Get given to the second wife has no impact either, and he can marry the second wife's relatives (mother, sister, etc.)

If, on the other hand, a Get does have the same effect as chalitzah, then all bonds between the remaining brother and the second wife are already dissolved, and giving her a Get now means nothing, for he is giving a Get to a stranger. This is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, which can be expressed as “There is no Get after a Get.”

The Sages, however, say that “There is Get after a Get,” meaning that Get weakens the bond but does not dissolve it completely. Therefore, the first wife still needs a chalitzah, even after getting a Get. Also, the second wife is still connected to the brother, and if he gives her a Get, it is valid to the extent that he cannot marry her relatives, and she cannot marry his.

Why is this a partial situation? – This decree is to avoid confusion. If the Get had no validity, people could reason thus: “Get effects separation and chalitzah effect separation. Just as we see that the Get here has no effect, so too chalitzah has no effect other than allowing the woman to marry anyone outside the family,” and the people may then do a yibum, which is prohibited after chalitzah. This follows the rule that there is only one chance to re-build the brother's house, but not two.

Art: Four Fisherwives by Winslow Homer

Yevamot 49 – How Manasseh killed Isaiah

Rabbi Akiva has a stringent opinion about a mamzer: any time the union is forbidden by a mere “don't do it” commandment, the child is already a mamzer. What is his logic? The Torah said, “A man shall not uncover the robe of his father,” and it was talking about a woman with whom his father was intimate out of wedlock (mere “don't do it” for the son), and yet next is the phrase about a mamzer.

However, Shimon Hatimni says that the transgression must be more severe, one that deserves death at the hands of Heaven, and this is the accepted opinion. Rabbi Yehoshua says that to produce a mamzer, the union must carry an even stronger prohibition that warrants death by court judgment.

There was an old scroll in Jerusalem which supported Rabbi Yehoshua. The scroll also told that Manasseh (an idolatrous king) killed the prophet Isaiah (who was his grandfather). Here is how it happened. First, Manasseh judged Isaiah as a false prophet. He said, "You claim to have seen God, but Moses, your teacher said that one cannot see God and live.”"Manasseh found two more such contradictions. Isaiah had explanations for all of them but decided not to say them. He judged that Manasseh would not accept them but act in cold blood and preferred to keep him ignorant and erring. Instead, Isaiah said the unique name of God and was absorbed into a cedar tree. His tzitzit was visible, however, and the servants of Manasseh began to chop the cedar. When they came to Isaiah's mouth, he died. Why did he deserve it? For the phrase that he said earlier, “I live among people of impure mouths.” One should not speak evil of the community of Israel.

Art: The Cedar Tree by George Frederick Watts

Yevamot 47 – Accepting converts

A man came to Rav Yehudah and said, “Even though everybody considers me Jewish, the truth is that I have converted myself, without the presence of a court of three.” Rav Yehudah asked, “Do you have children?” The man answered, “yes.” Rabbi Yehudah then said, “You are believed to disqualify yourself from being Jewish, but not to disqualify your children.”

Why is the man believed about himself? – Because anybody can create a prohibition with his own words in the situation where he stands to lose. But why is he not believed in his children? After all, a father is believed to tell us which of these sons is the firstborn!? Once we believe him that he is an idolater, he is no longer qualified to testify on Jewish matters. Others say that the man believes even about his children, precisely because we would believe him about the firstborn, but he is not believed about his grandchildren.

In general, if one comes and says that he wishes to convert and become Jewish, they tell him that he is joining a persecuted and pursued people, and if he still persists, they begin the process right away. They also say to him about a few of the mitzvot that he will have to keep and inform him of the seriousness of the prohibitions of Shabbat and the like. However, they also tell him about rewards in the World to Come. Finally, they inform him that he will have to give charity, and in Israel of the tithes that he will have to give. However, they don't overwhelm him with stringencies, as is learned from the behavior of Naomi toward Ruth, a righteous convert.

Art: Children by Boris Dmitrievich Grigoriev

Yevamot 46 – Conversion to Judaism

What is required to become Jewish? All that is needed is for one to be circumcised. That was all that the Jews did in Egypt. The verse states, “For all the people that went forth from Egypt were circumcised” – this is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Yehoshua says just the opposite: immersion in a mikvah is the only requirement since this is all that Jewish women did when they went out of Egypt. Obviously, they could not be circumcised, but how do we know they went to the mikvah? If not that, how were they brought into the Divine presence? But, since a woman can't be circumcised, how can we learn from that law for a man? Rabbi Yehoshua says that we indeed can.

However, the Sages maintain that both circumcision and immersion in a mikvah are required. What is their logic? – They agree both with Rabbi Yehoshua and with Rabbi Eliezer and thus come up with both requirements.

Rav Safra tells a story how he was visiting Rabbi Chiya, with yet another Sage, and a convert came to them. He was circumcised but not immersed in a mikveh. Rabbi Chiya told him to wait until tomorrow morning, for then they would administer an immersion for him. We see three things from here: that both circumcision and immersion are required, that this immersion cannot be done at night, and that three people need to be present. Can we also derive that they all need to be Sages? – No, this is just how it happened.

Art: Jews at the Wailing Wall by Gustave Bauernfeind

Yevamot 45 – A child from a mixed marriage

A child born from a Jewish woman and an idolater is a mamzer since the Torah said, “Do not intermarry with them,” implying that there is no legal significance in such marriage. As a result, the child is a mamzer. However, this is only one point of view.

The opposite point of view is that a mamzer is only born from a union of a married Jewish woman and another Jewish man. This disagreement persisted for centuries. Rav, who lived somewhat later, declared this child kosher. A man who was a Sage and whose father was an idolater said to Rav, “If such a child is kosher, give me your daughter in marriage.” Rav refused, but the man kept insisting. Finally, Rav set his gaze on him, and the man died. The law was established, and there was no counter-example to contest it.

Art: Woman With A Child In A Pantry by Pieter De Hooch

Yevamot 44 – Four brothers

If four brothers were married to four women, not related between themselves, and then all these brothers died, the oldest of the remaining brothers can – if he wishes – take all four as his wives in yibum.

This ruling, however, raises many questions. The Torah, in describing yibum, said, “And the Sages of his city will summon him and speak to him.” We understand that they give him appropriate advice. If he was old and she – young, they would tell him, “What do you have in common with such a young woman? Find somebody more appropriate for your age, and don't bring strife in your house.” They would say the same if the ages were reversed.

Since most people will have difficulty supporting four wives, how do they let him do it in this case? – We must answer that we are dealing with a situation where he has the means. But if so, what is the novelty? It is obvious! – The ruling gives him good advice: he should not take more than four wives to fulfill the marital obligation with each one at least once a month.

If one re-marries his ex-wife, who married someone else in the interim, the child is a mamzer. That is only the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, but the Sages say that a mamzer is born only through a liaison with a married woman or a similar severe transgression. All agree, however, about another situation. If one divorced his wife and married any of her forbidden relatives, the child is indeed a mamzer. Regarding in-law relationships, a divorcée is like a wife.

Art: Portrait Of A Young Woman In An Interior by Gustave Caillebotte

Yevamot 41 – Three months

To avoid the problems with the uncertain parenthood mentioned before, the Sages decreed that a woman should wait three months after her husband's death before marrying again. The Torah said, "... to be a God for you and your offspring after you." We see that one of the requirements of the covenant is to clearly distinguish between the offspring of the first husband and the second one. The decree was extended to all cases of marriages and even betrothals, where childbearing should not be an issue – to prevent confusion.

Rabbi Yehudah disagrees: people won't be confused. So he allows, for example, a betrothed girl whose groom died to get married to another man right away. Similarly, a married woman can get engaged and wait three months for the chuppah. The exception is a betrothed girl in the province of Yehudah, where it was known that the grooms may have been too familiar with their brides.

Rabbi Yose goes even further: there is no need to distinguish between the offspring of the first husband and the second one. Everybody can get married right away, except a widow, who needs to wait thirty days because of mourning obligation.

Art: Portrait of a Bridegroom by Antonius Heusler

Yevamot 38 – Widow's inheritance

A woman whose husband died and who is awaiting a yibum or chalitzah from the husband's brother is in some measure this brother's wife. How do they share in money?

For example, if she gets an inheritance from her father's family, she has full control over it, and can sell it or give it away, and her late husband's brothers cannot get it back. However, what happens if she dies? Since it is uncertain whether she is a wife or not, half of the property that constitutes her inheritance goes to her father's family, but the other half goes to the husband's brothers – that is the opinion of Beit Shammai.

However, Beit Hillel uses a different method: in a case of doubt, the money remains in possession of that one who possesses it right now.

For example, her Ketubah - money that she gets upon divorce or the husband's death - remains in possession of those who own it - the husband's heirs.

Similarly, the property that she brought in and assessed at a certain sum, also called a dowry, remains in possession of the one who owns them. However, who possesses it? Our ruling does not say – and it is in itself a further disagreement: some say it is the husband's heirs, some – that it is the wife's heir, and yet others – that both sides possess it, so they would divide them. These and similar laws are discussed in more detail in the Talmud sections dealing with inheritance.


Art: Her Future Dowry by Antoine Jean Bail

Yevamot 37 – Yibum with a pregnant widow

If a woman's husband dies and leaves no son,  the late husband's brother can do a yibum (marriage) or a chalitzah (divorce) with the widow. However, the Sages asked to delay either for three months.

Here is why. Imagine that one marries the late brother's wife only two months after the brother dies. Imagine also that she gives birth seven months after this. Now we have two possibilities. It could be that this child is the full-term baby of the deceased. In this case, yibum was forbidden in the first place, they have transgressed and must bring a sacrifice, and he needs to divorce her because one cannot live with the wife of this brother who died but left a child.

On the other hand, if it is his child born after seven months of pregnancy (in the time of the Talmud, most babies were born after nine months, but a minority of healthy babies were born after seven months.) Now it transpires that he was correct in doing a yibum, and they can continue living together.

However, we cannot distinguish between the two cases: it may be a child of nine months, which means that the marriage is a transgression, or of seven months, in which case the wedding would be a mitzvah. Since they cannot resolve this uncertainty, he still must divorce her, and they bring the sacrifice prescribed for such doubts. But the child is not a mamzer in either case: either it is a child of the late brother or of the live one, and in both cases, it is legitimate.

Art: Mother and Child by Cornelis C. Zwaan

Yevamot 36 – Chalitzah with a pregnant widow

If one's brother dies and leaves a pregnant widow, chalitzah or yibum should not be required – since they apply only when a man dies childless. If one still goes ahead and performs a chalitzah, it is meaningless at this time.

However, if later she miscarries and it turns out that the brother did die childless after all – then now the chalitzah would be required. The question arises: does the previously performed chalitzah suffice? Rabbi Yochanan gives a general rule: a chalitzah of a pregnant woman is actually valid because now it transpires that she did need one. Likewise, a yibum performed with a pregnant woman also counts for the future. Why? Should Elijah the Prophet (who knows the future) come and reveal to us that she will miscarry, then the chalitzah would be valid – and therefore, it is valid even now. Alternatively - says Rabbi Yochanan - the proof is from the rule we had learned before, which states that "the marriage can continue." This means that the yibum with the pregnant woman is valid!

However, Resh Lakish disagrees on all counts and declares the chalitzah or yibum invalid. As far as Elijah and his knowledge of the future – Resh Lakish answers that right now, at least, we do not know the future and should judge accordingly, not using the logic of retroactively changing the meaning of current events based on the future outcomes. And as far as the rule of "the marriage can continue" – which seems to imply that the original yibum was valid – Resh Lakish will answer that it was not. Instead, a new yibum is required, and the marriage can continue.

Art: The Widow by Pavel Andreevich Fedotov

Yevamot 35 – The widow who is pregnant

If one's brother dies childless, the remaining brother is bonded to the widow, so he must either do a yibum (which serves as marriage) or a chalitzah (akin to divorce). However, since the widow may be pregnant, the Sages established that neither yibum nor chalitzah can be done for ninety days after the brother dies.

If the brother violated this decree and performed chalitzah earlier, and then it was found out that the widow was pregnant – which means that the brother did not die childless -- then the chalitzah was meaningless. As a result, he is still allowed to marry the widow's relatives – because he was never connected to her. Likewise, she is permitted to marry his relatives: a valid chalitzah is considered a divorce, thus forbidding her to marry his relatives, but this chalitzah is considered nothing. She is not a divorcee and can even marry a Kohen.

However, if the brother hurried to do a yibum but found that his brother's wife was already pregnant with a child, then he was not allowed to do a yibum, because it does not apply in the presence of a child. Since he transgressed a prohibition of marrying his brother's wife in the situation when this is forbidden, they have to separate, and bring a sacrifice. However, if they later find out that the child was not viable, the marriage can continue.

Art: A Widow by James Jacques Joseph Tissot

Yevamot 32 – Wife's sister

Imagine that there are two brothers (Reuven and Shimon) married to two sisters. If Reuven dies, the laws of yibum would dictate that Shimon should now marry his wife. However, she is the sister of Shimon's own wife, and one cannot marry two sisters. Therefore, Reuven's widow needs neither yibum nor chalitzah and is free to remarry.

However, now Shimon's own wife dies, and he and his brother's widow are left alone. Nothing stands in the way of Shimon making yibum with his brother's widow – but this is not true. Since Reuven's widow was forbidden to Reuven at some point of time, this prohibition now stands forever, and he cannot marry her.

What if he married her, despite being told not to? – He is liable on two counts: she is his brother's wife, and she is his wife's sister. However, Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that he is only liable because of the first prohibition, and some say – only because of the second. How can Rabbi Shimon hold two opinions at once? Actually, there is no contradiction. The second opinion applies when Shimon married his wife first (so that now the second sister is already forbidden to him as his wife's sister). Then Reuven married his wife (so that the second prohibition is not superimposed over the first one). The first opinion refers to the opposite chronological order.

Art: Sisters by Walter C. Strich Hutton

Yevamot 30 – What does the intent to marry accomplish?

We saw that the Sages instituted “an intent to marry” in the case of yibum, which looks like a regular engagement. Note, however, that the couple is already married in some sense: the mitzvah of yibum is accomplished by intercourse, and strictly speaking, no other formalities are required. Therefore, what does the declaration of this intent accomplish, an engagement or a complete marriage?

That was the question posed by Rabbah. Abaye asked – for what practical purpose are we asking? If it is for a Kohen to allow him to bury her if she dies – the answer is clear: even for a real engaged bride, a Kohen is not allowed to go to the cemetery, and certainly not for one with whom there is only an intent to marry. And if the question is, do we need a chuppah marriage ceremony, then the answer is clear also: he could do a yibum even against her will, so now that he made a declaration, does it make it any worse? Of course, he does not need a chuppah!

However, Rabbah answered that this is not so simple. Before the declaration, he indeed had the right to do yibum. But now that he made it, maybe he lost this right, got the right of a mere engagement instead, and does need a chuppah.

The question remains without a conclusive proof, and besides it concerns only the opinion of Beit Shammai, while the practical law always accords with the opposing opinion of Beit Hillel.

Art: The Bride by Edward Alfred Angelo Goodall

Yevamot 29 – Statement of intent

Imagine two brothers married to two sisters, who have a third brother, a bachelor. One of the married brothers dies, and the bachelor now has to do a mitzvah of yibum or chalitzah with the widow.

Although the mitzvah of yibum simply means that the brother lives with the widow, the Sages established an additional "statement of intent to marry," which looks like a betrothal. The bachelor acts as proper and makes this statement. However, then the second brother dies. What is the situation of yibum now?

Beit Shammai sees no problem: he can keep his wife, to which he made a statement, and the other one – she is his wife's sister – does not need either a yibum or a chalitzah. Beit Shammai regards a statement as a valid betrothal, making them husband and wife. Usually, before they can live together, there must be a marriage ceremony, but because yibum already allows them, it is not required.

However, Beit Hillel says that the statement only looks like a betrothal, but being that it is not a real one, but only an action instituted by the Sages for propriety, she is not his legal wife. Therefore, he cannot keep her – because there is another sister with whom he is connected with the bond of yibum, nor can he marry that sister because of the same bond, plus his additional statement; in both cases, he is as if marrying his wife's sister, which is forbidden. Therefore, he must do a chalitzah with the first sister and give her a divorce document (Get) because of his prior statement. He then needs to do chalitzah with the other sister. He is thus left without any wife through no fault of his own.

Art: The Betrothal by Jose Juarez

Yevamot 26 – Four brothers and two sisters

If there were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and the married brothers died, how do the remaining brothers perform the mitzvah of yibum? The easiest solution seems to be that each brother marries (does yibum) one of the sisters. However, as we discussed before, there is a concept of "bond": each live brother is considered to be married to some degree to each of the two sisters, through the possibility of yibum with her. Thus, since he has this bond with one sister, he cannot marry the other one because this other sister is as if his wife's sister. The same reasoning applies to both sisters: this bond precludes him from marrying the other. Therefore, they should give a chalitzah to each of the sisters.

We have explained this rule by the existence of the bond. However, not everybody accepts this idea. Some say that such bond does not exist. How then would they explain the rule that the brother in this situation can only do chalitzah but not yibum? – He will say: consider the possibility that one of the brothers does yibum, but then the other brother dies. The remaining sister now cannot marry the live brother, because he has already married her sister. Nor is there another brother to marry her. Thus, she needs no yibum or chalitzah, and the mitzvah of yibum is dissolved and lost. One should not loose a mitzvah, and this is why the yibum is forbidden by the Sages. Instead, the brothers should do a chalitzah, so that the mitzvah is performed at least in some way, rather than disappear altogether.

Art: A family portrait of two brothers and two sisters by Wybrand Simonsz de Geest

Yevamot 24 – He does not know whom he married

If a man betrothed one of two sisters but does not know which of them he betrothed – he needs to give a divorce (Get) to each one. He cannot live with any one of them – because perhaps he betrothed the other one, and this one is prohibited to him as his wife's sister.

If he dies before divorcing, his brother performs a chalitzah with both – on the eventuality that each can be his brother's wife.

If he had two brothers, then one must do a chalitzah with one, but the other brother can marry the other sister. This is permitted according to both possibilities: if her sister, who got the chalitzah, was really the wife – then the bond is now dissolved, and he can marry the other sister. And if her sister was not the true wife, then the chalitzah meant nothing, and the brother is now marrying his deceased brother's wife, that is, doing a yibum.

However, they cannot both marry, each one to a sister. The one who marries the true wife is doing a yibum, and that is fine. But the other one – he is marrying a woman to whom there is a yibum-bond, something we discussed earlier. Still, if they don't consult and just go ahead and marry, they can stay married – because each one can claim that he did the yibum, and it is the other brother who was in violation, and now anyway, the yibum bond is no longer there.

The eldest brother is the one who should do the yibum, but if the younger one has preceded him – he has acquired the mitzvah.

Art: The Cameron Sisters by Stephen Catterson Smith

Yevamot 23 - Who is a Jew?

Earlier, we mentioned that a child born to a slave woman or a non-Jewish woman is not considered Jewish. As a result, many family laws do not apply. For example, the child is not included in the inheritance rules. If that child is a daughter, then the man's son can marry her after she converts. The Sages later forbade this marriage to avoid confusion.

How do we know this rule? – The Torah said," "Do not intermarry with them... for he will turn your children away from Me, and they will serve other gods" Why did the Torah say "he" and not "she" or" "they?" Because the relationship is not equal. He (the non-Jewish husband of your Jewish daughter) will lead your Jewish children astray. Hence, this is still your child. But she (the non-Jewish wife of your Jewish son) will not lead your Jewish children astray – because they are not considered Jewish, they are not "your" children for the Jewish law.

Can we deduce that in the opposite case, when a non-Jew marries a Jewish woman, the child is entirely kosher? – Not quite. He is not an illegitimate child; he is not a mamzer, but he is blemished: if the child is a daughter, she cannot marry a Kohen.

Art: The most devoted of her slaves by Briton Rivière

Yevamot 22 – Any child

Any son that a man has relieves his wife from the mitzvah of yibum or chalitzah, which she would otherwise have to do after her husband's death. The Torah said that only when "and one of them dies childless" does the mitzvah of yibum apply.

What did the teacher mean by "any child?" He could have said it shorter, "A child." – Even a mamzer – a son born from a woman married to another. But how do we know that? Maybe the Torah discusses only a legitimate son? – From the words "And he has no son," - "U ben ein lo." The term "ein" can be understood as "ain," which would mean an eye, telling us to look into the matter and discover any existing son. For example, if he has a daughter, she also exempts her mother from yibum. The exception to this case is a child born from a slave or a non-Jewish woman, who is not considered the man's offspring for the purposes of Jewish law.

In a similar vein, “any brother” to whom the mitzvah of yibum applies also includes a mamzer. He is also a real brother for burial – so that if the father is a Kohen, and this son of his dies, then other brothers are permitted to go to the cemetery for his burial. This brother also inherits together with the other brothers, and he is liable for cursing his father.

The last point needs explanation. The Torah said, "Do not curse a prince (and anyone in general) in your people," so this prohibition only applies to people who observe Torah laws and do "the conduct of your people." This father sired a mamzer, and he is not doing the right thing, so the son should not be liable for cursing him!? – The father repented. But the mamzer is alive, so the repentance cannot work! – No, it can, because at least now the father behaves appropriately.

Art: Portrait Of A Father And Son by Florentine School

Yevamot 18 – Bond of yibum

When a brother dies childless, his wife is bound to the other brother: she cannot marry out of the family. The remaining brother either does a yibum (marries her) or gives her a chalitzah (releases her). This bond thus is similar to marriage.

How strong is it? Do we say that it is almost like a marriage that already exists? Take, for example, this case: a woman whose husband died is awaiting a yibum, but then she dies. Can the brother marry this woman's mother? If the brother and the woman were actually married, then, of course, he cannot also marry her mother. But they were never married – they were only connected through a yibum-bond.

Rav Huna says that yes, he can marry her mother. There is no strong connection created by the yibum bond. Now the Talmud begins to analyze the statement. Why didn't Rav Huna simply state, "There is no bond!?" If he did that, we might have thought that even while the woman (yevamah) is still alive, he can disregard the bond and marry her mother. This is not so, however: one is forbidden to destroy the potential for the mitzvah of yibum, and that is what he would have done by marrying the mother.

Rav Yehudah disagrees and says that one cannot marry the mother in this situation. The same question: why didn't Rav Yehudah simply state that "there is a bond?!" – He wants to teach us another lesson. If he said, "There is a bond," we might have thought that it is valid only when there is only one remaining brother, which is why the bond is strong. But should there be many brothers, and the power of the bond be divided among them, then perhaps it would not stop a brother from marrying the woman's mother – so Rav Yehudah had to state this prohibition for all brothers.

Art: Portrait Of The Artists Mother by Franz Marc

Yevamot 17 – A very young brother

The laws of yibum apply only when two brothers live simultaneously, and one dies childless. However, if the brother is not contemporary, he cannot do a yibum. What do you mean?

There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon, and Reuven dies childless. Shimon should now marry Reuven's wife, but he waits. Meanwhile, a third brother, Levi, is born. Now Shimon marries the widow. He has his own wife also, and now he dies – the two wives are looking at Levy. However, Levy cannot marry the first one because she is his brother's wife, and when Levi was born, Reuven was already not alive. Thus, the first wife goes free and does not need either yibum or chalitzah from Levi. The second wife goes free because of the first one. This is one of the fifteen women of the basic rule, but we treat it in more detail here.

How do we know that the above is true? The Torah said, "If two brothers live together (in the world)" – which means that the two brothers should be contemporaries, and then the laws of yibum apply. If not, the other brother's wife is always forbidden to the young brother.

Incidentally, this phrase also teaches us that it applies only to brothers of the same father – just like the twelve brothers who were the sons of Jacob and are called brothers – so here too, "brothers" should be from the same father.

Art: Jacob Sending his Son Joseph to Look for his Brothers by Eustache Le Sueur

Yevamot 15 – Did Beit Shammai do it?

Earlier, we learned that a marriage permitted according to Beit Shammai would lead, according to Beit Hillel, to a severe consequence of a child being a mamzer and being forbidden to marry a Jew. Therefore, the question is, did Beit Shammai actually follow their point of view in practice?

One attempt to decide this is by analyzing the story of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who said, "How are we to resolve it? Should we simply agree with Beit Shammai? But the child is mamzer, according to Beit Hillel! And if we simply agree with Beit Hillel – but the child of the marriage they allow is not fit to marry a Kohen, soon we will not have priests! Rather, let's do this: in every such case, let us do a chalitzah, but not a yibum. Since we ban yibum, we will never come into a problem with Beit Hillel: even if they do halitzah, it is meaningless, and so no harm. And according to Beit Shammai, this will also be acceptable because they require either a yibum or chalitzah. However, the Sages never got to vote and put this measure into practice."

Can we deduce from this that Beit Shammai actually acted according to their view? For otherwise, what “previous cases” are we talking about?

Not necessarily! It could be that this measure was not flawless for a different reason. By "previous cases," we mean the cases of Beit Hillel: the husbands who married their wives following the view of Beit Hillel will now observe their wives getting chalitzah from another man, implying that the husband's marriage was illegal until then! This cannot be, for "All the Torah's ways are pleasantness, and all its paths are peace."

Art: Double portrait of a husband and wife by Wolfgang Heimbach

Yevamot 13 – A mitzvah marriage of Beit Hillel is illegitimate for Beit Shammai

Earlier we learned that if a man is forbidden to marry the wife of his deceased brother, if she is his close relative, all other co-wives of this brother are equally forbidden to the man, and no halitzah or yibum is required.

Beit Shammai disagrees with this basic rule and permits one to marry a co-wife of the deceased brother. This leads to many significant consequences. For example, if co-wives perform a halitzah, they are divorcees. They cannot marry a Kohen – that is according to Beit Shammai, but for Beit Hillel, who say that the halitzah was not needed in the first place and means nothing even if performed – they can still marry a Kohen.

More importantly, if a brother of the deceased makes a yibum to his co-wife and marries her, following the opinion of Beit Shammai that this allowed, the children of such marriage will be mamzerim, according to Beit Hillel. Mamzerim are not allowed to marry a Jew, and the child of a mamzer is still a mamzer!

Even though they had such dividing disagreements, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel still maintained a friendly relationship, would intermarry, and relied on each other for purity laws of sacrifices. This is because they trusted each other so that if a situation that is permitted according to one but forbidden to another arose, they knew that they would be honestly informed.

Art: Group portrait of a husband and wife in a drawing-room by Arthur Alfred Davis

Yevamot 10 – Case number sixteen

Even though Rabbi Yehudah sharply rebuked Levy for his suggestion, the latter insisted on his understanding and added case number sixteen to the list of women who exempt their co-wives from yibum. Here it is.

Let us say one's mother was legally married to his father (a standard case), but after his father's death, she "married" his brother (from another woman). The "marriage" of his mother and his brother never took legal effect because she was previously married to the brother's father. Therefore, if his brother now dies, there isn't even a suggestion that he should marry his mother in yibum.

However, if his father "violated" his mother – that is, lived with her without getting married – then his brother (his father's son from another woman) can indeed marry his mother. If this brother now dies, our protagonist finds himself in the position of a yibum; but since he cannot marry his mother, she does not get a yibum or chalitzah from him, and his brother's other wives also don't need a yibum or chalitzah. This is precisely the situation of the fifteen cases above, and this is case number sixteen that Levy wanted to include.

If so, why did Rabbi Yehudah disagree? – Because this scenario involves an "if-he-does" case, a prohibited act of son "marrying" his father's former wife, and Rabbi Yehudah claims that such cases which involve a transgression were not included in the basic rule.

Art: Double portrait of a father and son by Jacob Gerritsz. Cuyp

Yevamot 9 – Why only fifteen cases?

Rabbi Yehudah the Prince takes the extra words "to her" and learns a lesson utterly different from our previous one: "to her" refers "to the error (feminine)" that one commits when he worships idols. The exact same words connect the two areas of the law and teach when and what sacrifice one must bring.

Levi asked Rabbi Yehudah the Prince, "Why did the central rule of Yevamot" teach only fifteen cases? It should teach sixteen!" Rabbi Yehudah replied, "It seems like this one has no brains in his head!" But what sixteenth woman could Levy have meant? The Talmud suggests that it may be a daughter of a man who violated a woman and whom his son married – but discards the idea since this case is actually a disagreement, and the rule of fifteen was unanimous. It also suggests many other, much more complicated relationships but discards them all and explains why Rabbi Yehudah would not agree to any such scenario as a sixteenth case.

Also, the phrase "this one has no brains in his head" implies that the answer should be obvious and that Levy should have deduced the answer independently. Thus, the phrase itself carries additional information, and the Talmud discussed what it might be.

Art: Fisherman and his Daughter by Charles Hawthorne

Yevamot 8 – Brother's wife or wife's sister?

Earlier, we said that if one's brother dies childless, one has to marry his brother's widow or release her through the procedure of "chalitzah." What if she happens to also be his wife's sister? That is, what if two brothers were married to two sisters, and one brother died. Usually, we would say that a man can't marry his wife's sister while his wife is alive. However, perhaps here, since one prohibition is lifted and he has to marry the widow, he can do so even though he will be married to sisters?

Where would we see that "once a prohibition is lifted, other prohibitions are lifted as well?" – In the laws of a metzora (spiritual leper). Usually, a metzora is not allowed to visit the Temple. However, to purify himself, he needs to. And, once he is on the way to do so, he is allowed to disregard other kinds of impurity, such as last night's seminal emission. Should we apply this principle and permit one to marry any close relative if she happens to be in the "yibum" situation with him? – No! To prevent such a possible way of thinking, the Torah added extra words, "to her" – to teach that the wife's sister is prohibited even in the situation of yibum.

Even though the principle of "once a prohibition is lifted, other prohibitions are lifted as well" does not apply here because of the extra words "to her" and also because of other ways of how this prohibition can be derived, it nevertheless finds applications in other areas.

Art: Portrait of the Shishmariov Sisters by Jules Elie Delauney