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What is the reason the Kohen would pour this blood in that particular place, and what is the Torah source for this? The verse states, “And all the remnant of the blood of the bull he shall pour onto the base of the burnt-offering Altar, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” The burnt-offering Altar is the “Outer Altar”, positioned in Temple Courtyard. The “Tent of the Meeting” was designated the inner Hall of the Tabernacle while it traveled in the desert, and then this term was transfered to the Temple Hall.
Which part of the Altar does the Kohen encounter first when he exits the Temple Hall? The western part. Since the rule is that one may not pass up the opportunity to do a mitzva, even in order to do another one, he pours out the blood right there.
Art: Thomas Sidney Cooper - A Bull And Cow, Two Sheep And A Goat
Let's look at the “same aspect” rule. If the Torah compared two situations and said, “just as...so is” - then this is the “same aspect” rule, and we can learn the laws of one from the other. However, the “same aspect” derivations cannot be chained. If something is learned by comparison of its aspect to another, it cannot turn around and teach us other laws. Why not? We see this from the following situation: the Torah compared sin offering to burnt offering; it also compared a guilt offering to a sin offering. One would expect that we can make this chain deduction: sin offering is similar to burnt offering, guilt offering is similar to a sin offering, therefore guilt offering is similar to burnt offering. However, Torah explicitly taught the comparison of guilt offering to burnt offering, to teach us that the “same aspect” rules are not transitive.
Art; Pieter the Elder Bruegel - Two Chained Monkeys
Can we say this: since the sin-offering must be slaughtered in the North, and its laws are learnt from the laws of the burnt offering, then of course the burnt offering must be in the North - for we never find that a derived law is stronger than the basic one!
No, we can't really say it. Take, for example, the second tithe, which may be redeemed for money, but after it was redeemed once, it cannot be redeemed again - which is stronger! - Wrong! The sanctity of second redemption is weaker, not stronger, and that's why it cannot be redeemed.
Another attempt: take the Passover offering, which does not require libations, but if it is brought after Passover, it does require them! So the second time around it is stronger! - Wrong! It simply becomes a peace offering which requires libations.
We have deflected all attacks, but anyway we have a better proof, "in the place of the burnt offering" tells us that the burnt offering should stay in its place.
Art: Pieter the Elder Bruegel - The Slaughter Of The Innocents 1565-66
Following most holy sacrifices require slaughter in the northern side of the Courtyard: the bull and he-goat of Yom Kippur; the communal offerings of bull and goat that are completely burnt; the communal and the private sin-offerings; the burnt offering; and the communal peace- and guilt-offerings.
The Torah mentioned the north requirement in connection with the burnt offering. Why did the teacher not list this first? Because this requirement for the sin-offering was derived using the rules of Torah exposition, and as such, it was more beloved to him. The teacher used it to sharpen the minds of his students.
What is this derivation? "In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin-offering be slaughtered."
Art: Jan Steen - The Severe Teacher
Now we begin to study the proper places for sacrificial services. All most holy offerings are slaughtered to the north of the Altar. The first ones on this list are the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur service – their slaughter is to the north of the Altar, and their blood should be received in the service vessel to the north of the Altar.
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The blood is forbidden to be consumed in any case. Furthermore, one is liable if he eats the substances as “leftovers” or if he eats them while being ritually impure, and for that he still gets the penalty of being cut off from the people. “Leftovers” designate any sacrifice that is eaten beyond its allotted time. Consuming blood is also forbidden under the penalty of being cut off, but one does not get an additional penalty if he eats it as “leftovers” or while being impure.
What is the practical difference? One is “cut off” from Heaven, thus, being “cut off” more than once is left to Heaven to decide. However, if one, for example, eats blood inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and there may be more than one sin-offering, if he commits a transgression bearing multiple penalties.
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However, because most of the offerings laws of sacrifices include the term “sons of Israel”, the non-Jewish are excluded from some stringencies. Thus, if a Kohen, while slaughtering the sacrifice, intends that its meat will be eaten beyond the allotted time, then, even though the sacrifice becomes invalid, eating its meat does not carry the usual penalty of being cut off from the people. The same applies to the leftover meat which was left beyond its time, and to eating it in the state of ritual impurity. These are the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose, however, holds a person liable to the usually penalty for all these actions.
Art: Jacob Jordaens - Eating Man
Here is the relevant passage, “If some of the meat-offering of his peace-offering will be consumed at all on the third day...it shall be rejected” and the person who eats it will be cut off from the people.
We have already learned that this verse is talking about the intention to eat on the third day, not the real eating on the third day – since the meat becomes rejected right away, which can only happen as a result of his intention.
However, how do we know that this law equally applies to other sacrifices, and not only to those that are similar to peace-offering, which would include just first-born and tithe? - From the extra word “of the meat” we learn that it applies to all sacrifices that are eaten. What about sacrifices that are not eaten, like the burnt-offering? - This is learned from the extra “offering” in the word combination “meat-offering.”
Art: Frederick Daniel Hardy - First-Born
For example, if the Kohen, while receiving the blood, intends to eat the meat of the sacrifice beyond the allotted time, the meat becomes rejected right away, and whoever eats it, deserves to be cut off from the people. The blood itself, however, does not become rejected.
Other permitters that do not become rejected include the handful of flour separated by the Kohen from the flour offering, and its frankincense. The flour offering of a Kohen is never rejected because it is completely burned and has no permitter. The same is true for the flour offering of the High Priest, which is brought daily, half in the morning and half in the evening.
But, how can this rule even work for a flour offering that is completely burnt? If it has no permitter, when can the Kohen have the wrong intention? - While carrying the offering to the Altar.
Art: Max Liebermann - Interior of a flour mill in Florence
A “permitter” is the key service that allows the offering to be eaten. In the case of an animal offering its “permitter” is throwing its blood on the Altar. In the case of a flour offering the “permitter” is burning a handful of its flour together with oil and frankincense included in it, on the Altar. Some say that the wrong intention during half of the "permitter" already rejects the offering, and some say that it does not.
In addition, we want to know, what is the reason behind the disagreement in the following rule, and whether it is “half of the permitter” or something else: If the Kohen had the wrong intention of “beyond allotted time” while burning the frankincense but not the oil – then Rabbi Meir says that the offering becomes rejected, but the Sages say that it does not. Is this an example of the “half the permitter” disagreement? Resh Lakish said that it is not. Rather, the Kohen had the wrong intent at first, but then forgot about it – and Rabbi Meir says that his first intention continues, but the Sages say that it stops.
Art: Louis Robert Carrier-Belleuse - Delivering Flour-1885
The laws of the communal offering are learned from the laws of the High Priest's offering. Namely, when talking about a communal-error offering, which is brought when the High Court renders serious erroneous decision and many Jews follow it, the Torah does not discuss all the details, such as burning of the diaphragm and of the two kidneys. These details are mentioned when describing the similar individual offering of a High Priest, and one is learned from the other.
But why did the Torah have to conceal and only hint at the details? This is similar to a king who became angry at his beloved friend, but minimized the mention of his offense in the official records, because of endearment. In the same vein, when talking about a communal he-goat brought for the sin of idolatry, there is an even more-pronounced abbreviation, and the details of the service are not mentioned at all.
Art: Max Liebermann - Woman with Goats in the Dunes
The sacrifices that were brought inside the Temple Hall required seven blood sprinklings on the curtain and four applications to the Inner Altar. How do we know that these seven sprinklings were essential, and leaving out one of them would make the service invalid? - Because seven applications in all other places had this quality. And which are they? - The seven sprinklings of the preparation of the red heifer, and the seven sprinklings required for the purification of a spiritual leper.
How do we know that the four applications to the “horns” of the Inner Altar are also essential? - From the verse “so shall he do.” This is an additional repetition of the requirement to do the prescribed service. Since we derived on the basis of the first repetition that the seven sprinklings toward the curtain are essential, we may derive from this repetition that the four applications to the horn are also essential.
Art: John Frederick Herring Snr - Galloping Horse in a Landscape
For these sacrifices all four blood applications were essential, and if the Kohen omitted one of them, he has not effected atonement. However, since all four applications thus work as a group, if the Kohen had the “beyond alloted time” intent during one of them, he has made the sacrifice invalid, but not to the point of rejection, and one who eats its meat does not incur being cut off from the people.
From where do we know this law? The Torah said, “He shall do to the blood of the communal-error bull as he would do to the blood of the bull of the High Priest.” This phrase was unnecessary, and thus it teaches an additional law, that all blood applications are essential.
Art: Filippo Palizzi - Feeding Time
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argue about how many blood applications are necessary for a sin offering. All agree that four applications are required, but Beit Shammai say that the offering is already valid after two such applications, while Beit Hillel maintain that even one is sufficient.
Beit Shammai rely on the phrase “on the horns” repeated three times. Since the minimum of the plural “horns” is two, altogether this counts as six. Four of these six teach the prescribed procedure, and the remaining two tell how many are absolutely necessary. Beit Shammai rely on the pronounced form of the word “horns”.
Beit Hillel point out that the written form for two of the three “horns” can be read as “one horn”. Beit Hillel attach more importance to the written form of the word. This gives them four “horns”, three for the prescribed after the first application, and one that is necessary for atonement. But Beit Hillel's count is inconsistent, they should use all four for the prescribed application, with none necessary to achieve atonement! They answer that we don't nowhere do we find atonement for nothing.
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Beit Shammai say that if a Kohen performed only one throwing of the blood, the offerings is valid. Although the second throwing is obligatory, it is not essential for the validity of the offering. In the case of a sin offering, where four applications are initially required, the first two make the offering valid. Beit Hillel disagree in the last case and say that even for a sin offering the first application already makes the offering valid.
Therefore, all agree that the Kohen's intent during the first blood application is what counts, and if he intended to consume the offering beyond allotted time, the offering is rejected. If he had a wrong intent during the second blood application, the offering remains valid.
Art: Karoly Ferenczy - Boys Throwing Pebbles into the River
We can very well understand the opinion of the Sages: only what the Torah rejected – that is, the intent to eat the meat of the sacrifice too late – only that is rejected, but why does Rabbi Yehudah declare it invalid? Rabbi Yehudah says that the Torah has stated the prohibition of eating the meat beyond its time twice. Since the repetition is not needed for its own sake, it teaches us an additional invalidation, namely, our case of intending to leave the sacrifice over.
If he had other unusual intentions, such as to apply the blood at the wrong height of the Altar, inside the Sanctuary instead of next to the Altar in the Courtyard, or it was a Passover offering, and he intended to eat it unroasted – in all these cases the sacrifice remains valid.
Art: George, of Chichester Smith - Still life with meat and bread
The answer is that either the Sage who authored the rule does not subscribe to the principle of "once rejected - forever rejected", or that a rejection that can be rectified by our hands - like in this case, where a fit person can take over - is not considered a rejection at all.
If, while slaughtering the sacrifice, one has a wrong intent about eating, and plans to eat in the wrong place or after allotted time - but what he plans to eat is not usually edible, such as the hide, or is not really the meat of the sacrifice, such as the gravy, or he plans to eat less than an olive's volume - the sacrifice remains valid.
Art: Jan Steen - Grace Before A Meal 1660
If a qualified person received the blood and handed it to a disqualified person, the latter should simply return the blood, and the service continues. If the kohen received the blood with his right hand, but then put the vessel in his left hand – he should return it to his right hand and continue. If the blood spilled on the floor and he gathered it – it is valid.
Resh Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan, “What if the disqualified person not only received the blood, but also threw it on the Altar, can this be corrected?” Rabbi Yochanan answered, “Yes. Unless he intended to eat it in the wrong place or beyond the right time, because then it became rejected.”
Art: Diego Rodriguez de Silva y Velazquez - Joseph's Bloody Coat Brought to Jacob
Rabbi Hoshaya challenged Ulla using the law of a leper (metzorah) who puts his fingers inside the courtyard to be anointed with special oil at the end of his purification. Although Ulla answered the challenge, Ravina rephrased Ulla's statement as talking about lashes and not, as we have assumed, about a more strict excision.
When Ravin came from Israel, he said that Resh Lakish's ruling was indeed stated about touching, not about entering the Courtyard, and in fact, the disagreement ran as follows. Resh Lakish said that an impure person who touches sacrificial food incurs lashes, while Rabbi Yochanan said he does not.
Art: Egon Schiele - Self Portrait With Black Vase And Spread Fingers
Thus, every non-Kohen, man or woman, or even an impure person is qualified to do the slaughter. Therefore, the thought of anyone who does the slaughter counts, and if they intend to eat the sacrifice beyond the allotted time, the sacrifice becomes rejected.
A ritually impure person faces a special problem: he should take care not to make the meat of the sacrifice impure. He has to either have the level of impurity that cannot be transmitted through the knife, or he has to use a sharp reed, which, as a flat wooden object, does not transmit impurity. Additionally, he has to stand outside the Courtyard and use a very long knife.
Art: Gustave Caillebotte - Garlic Cloves And Knife On The Corner Of A Table
We can learn the answer from what Levi asked of Rabbi Yehudah the Prince. Levi asked, “If one plans to eat a piece tomorrow in the wrong place, what is the law?” Previously Rabbi Yehudah taught other students two versions, with “and” and without, so they knew the answer. Levi, however, got only one version, without “and,” so he devised the question that would tell him both answers. If Rabbi Yehudah is annoyed, it means that Levi could have found the answer himself and that Levi's version was the correct one. But Rabbi Yehudah answered calmly, “It is a mixture of thoughts.” Now Levi knew both the answer to his question and that “a piece and a piece” was the correct version.
Art: Pieter Claesz - A Still Life With An Overturned Silver Tazza, A Silver Plate With A Partly Peeled Lemon And An Olive, With Walnuts And Hazelnuts
Here is a general rule: all the invalidations and rejections discussed before happen only when everything else was done properly. For example, if while receiving the blood, one had an intent to eat the sacrifice beyond allotted time, it becomes rejected – but only if the other services were done with the correct intent. Another condition for rejection is that one should also plan to eat those parts that are normally eaten, and burn those that are normally burned. However, if on the subsequent step of the service he had an wrong intent to continue outside the allowed place – the two intentions clash, and the invalidation does not happen.
Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and says that in the case where the more serious disqualification “outside of permitted time” occurred first, later wrong intent does not matter.
Art: Paul Cezanne - The Black Clock
“Will be consumed at all” teaches that the laws of invalidation are the same for consumption by man and by the Altar (burning on it). “On the third day” teaches the invalidation produced by intention to eat the sacrifice beyond its alloted time. “The one that offers” teaches that the invalidation occurs through the wrong intention of the one that offers, and that it does not occur, even retroactively, if the sacrifice is actually eaten on the third day. "The soul that eats it" teaches that one soul is punished, but not two souls, that is, only the intention "outside its time" leads to rejection, but not the intention "outside its place."
Art: Rembrandt Van Rijn - The Slaughtered Ox
The prescribed area for all sacrificial services is the Temple Courtyard. If one slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to throw its blood outside of the prescribed area, or even if he plans to throw a small part of the blood outside the prescribed area, the sacrifice becomes invalid – even if later he applies the blood in the correct place. The same is true if he intends to eat the sacrifice outside of prescribed area.
However, if the wrong intent relates to time, that is, if he plans to throw its blood tomorrow, even a small part of the blood; if he intends to burn the sacrificial parts the next day, or to eat its meat the next day – the sacrifice becomes completely rejected (“piggul”) - and one who eats of its meat can be cut off from his people. This is true even if does not fulfill his intent and later does everything in the right time.
Art: Frans van Mieris - An Elderly Couple Eating
There are many ways to understand this rule. Shmuel said that although the sacrifice is invalid, its owners still receive atonement, based on the phrase, “And I gave you and Altar for atonement”, implying all of the Altar. But one may ask that if so, the meat should also be eaten! - Shmuel understands “For atonement” only, not for other purposes.
Resh Lakish agrees with Shmuel if the Kohen applied the blood silently, but if he announced a wrong intent, it is completely invalid. Still, it does not qualify for being cut off.
Rabbi Yochanan says that applying the blood in the wrong place does not count at all.
Art: Zbigniew Tymoszewski - Still Life with a Piece of Meat
The father of Shmuel asked his son a question, “If one suspended an offering in the air and slaughtered it, what is the law?” Shmuel said that it was valid. “Wrong!” - said the father, since the slaughter has to be “At the side” of the Altar, not above. Next question, “What if the slaughterer was suspended in the air?” “It is invalid!” - answered Shmuel. “Wrong!” - said the father, slaughter should be “At the side,” not that the slaughterer should be “at the side.”
The Altar was 10 cubits (20 feet) high, and a red line marked the separation between the upper and the lower halves. The blood of most offerings was applied to the lower half; only the blood of the sin-offering and of the bird burnt-offering was applied at the upper half – ideally at the “horns” on top.
Art: Giovanni Martinelli - The Sacrifice Of Noah
The blood of the skin is that blood which is drawn from the animal's body with the initial cutting of the skin, before the inner organs are severed. The remnant blood is the blood that trickles out before and after the lifeblood. Neither can be used for sacrificial service.
The Kohen should receive the blood in a service vessel directly from the bull's neck. If the blood first spilled on the floor, and afterwards the Kohen gathered it up, it is invalid.
Rabbi Assi asked Rabbi Yochanan a question, “If one was receiving blood, and the bottom of the bowl gave way before the blood reached the airspace of the bowl, is it valid?” Rabbi Yochanan explained that if the bowl was defective and destined to fall apart, the blood is not considered resting in it, but if it was good – then the blood is considered received even before it reached the space inside the bowl.
Art: James Ward - Study of a Bull
It was indeed necessary to give all three examples. If we only knew about a utensil, we could have thought that it invalidates the service because it is not flesh. And if we knew only about an animal, we could have said, that is because it is not human flesh. Therefore, the rule in fact taught all three prohibitions.
If the Kohen stood with one foot on a vessel and another one on the Temple floor – we analyze the situation: if the vessel can be removed and the Kohen would still remain standing, the service is valid.
Rabbi Ami asked, if one stone was removed and the Kohen stood in the hole, what is the law? Given that King David sanctified both the upper level of the floor and the lower, the soil can serve as the floor, but is it proper to do the service that way? The question remained unanswered.
Rabbi Shimon permits to receive blood even with the left hand.
Art: John Singer Sargent - Feet Of An Arab, - Tiberias
In addition, any Kohen who is "estranged from his Father in Heaven," that is, who turned away from Torah observance, should not serve in the Temple, and if he does, his sacrifices are invalid. This is learned from the phrase in Ezekiel, "Uncircumcised in flesh and uncircumcised in heart". A questions was asked - and before Ezekiel ben Buzi, did the estranged Kohanim serve in the Temple? Of course not! Then how can we learn a new law from a prophet? We know that Moses taught all the laws the Torah, and they were not changed! - Yes, Moses taught it, but it was an oral tradition, until Ezekiel came and wrote it down.
Any kohen who is ritually impure invalidates the service. This is true only of impurity caused by a dead dead animal, such as a rat, but the impurity of a human corpse, since it is permitted under some circumstances, does not invalidate the service. Additionally, a Kohen who performs service while sitting invalidates the sacrifices.
Art: Charles Emile Callande de Champmartin - Study of a Head of a Corpse
If the water in the Kiyor remained there overnight, it become invalid and had to be replaced. Therefore, they used to lower the Kiyor into a mikvah, with the help of a wheel, just before daybreak, and according to other opinions, at more time periods during the night.
Any Temple vessel could also be used for sanctifying the Kohen's hands and feet, but a regular non-sacrificial vessel could not. Why? Let's try to prove this by comparison with the copper base, in which the Kiyor stood. Since this base could not be used for washing the Kohen's hands and feet, even though it was a Temple vessel, isn't it true that a regular vessel surely could not be used? - No! The base is not made for storing water at all! Rather, this is derived from the word that the Torah used - “from it” - and not from other vessels!
Art: Jean-Baptiste-Simeon Chardin - The Copper Drinking Fountain
The standard procedure for the kohanim to sanctify their hands and feet in the morning is as follows: the kohen is standing in front of the vessel, he places his hands on his feet, and the water is spilled on them from a spout in the vessel.
Could they to instead dip their hands and feet into the vessel? Can we derive the answer from another rule: if a kohen dipped his hands and feet in a mikvah, he still needs to sanctify them from the vessel. Can we conclude that it is only after a mikvah that he needs another sanctification? - Not necessarily, maybe dipping in the vessel is also ineffective.
Then why not state this rule about the vessel, and we will deduce the rule about the mikvah? Because you might have thought that, since one can ritually bathe the whole body in the mikvah, how much more so he is allowed to dip just hands and feet! Therefore, the rule tells you otherwise.
Art: Edgar Degas - Study of hands
Every Kohen has to sanctify his hands and feet by washing them from a special large Temple vessel in the morning. Otherwise, his service is invalid.
Rav Assi could not understand the difference between this washing and the ten washings of the High Priest on Yom Kippur, which accompany his five changes of garments - since they do not invalidate the service. Rabbi Yochanan explained to him that the phrase "and then don them" tells us that the garments are essential, but washing is not. Rav Assi's face lit up. But his joy was premature, because Rabbi Yochanan then said, "and by the same token the morning washing should not be significant."
Even if a Kohen was offering animal limbs on the Altar all night, Rabbi Yehudah the Prince says that he needs to wash them again at dawn, but Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon says that he does not need to repeat the washing even if he serves for ten days in a row.
If a Kohen steps out of the Temple, does he need to repeat the washing on return, because he took his mind off the service, or does he not, because he can choose to return any time? No decision is reached.
Art: Mattia Preti - Pilate Washing his Hands 1663
For a Kohen, a small bandage around a wound is forbidden, because it constitutes an extra garment. Another opinion is that an extra garment is only important in the place of garments, or on the right hand, which is used for service.
Rava asked a series of questions. If the wind entered the Kohen's garment, does this invalidate the service because the garment is not “on his body,” or is it a normal manner of wearing? Does a louse constitute interposition between the kohen's body and the garment? The dead one certainly does, but what about a live one? Since it comes and goes, it is like a growth on his body, or, since he does not like it, it is an interposition? What about the dust of the earth, a hand in his bosom, or thread hanging from the garment?
Art: Peeter Franchoys - Ruby on the Fingernail
Any Kohen priest who lacks the required four priestly garments, invalidates the sacrificial service. The four garments are pants, tunic, belt, and hat. Since the Torah said that “You shall girdle them with sash and put turbans on them and the priesthood will be for them an eternal law”, we see that when they have all the garments, they are considered priests, but if they lack some, they are considered strangers, and a stranger invalidates the service.
If they have extra garments, the extra ones invalidate the service because the required garments should be “on the body” and not on other garments. If the garments are too long, too short, or fitting well but shortened by the belt, some say that they are valid, and some say that they are not. However, all agree that if they were too long (dragging) but were shortened by the belt to the desired size, that is fine.
Art: John Bagnold Burgess - The Favourite Priest
One who is ritually impure today (tevul yom), for example, because of a contact with a dead rat, has to go to a mikveh. Still, some vestiges of ritual impurity linger until nightfall. If he receives the blood of a sacrifice, he makes it invalid, because of a verse “They shall be holy... and they shall not profane.” This verse is extra, and we apply it to the one who is partially impure.
One who lacks atonement. Some special cases of impurity, such as spiritual leprosy (metzora) require purification in stages, the last stage being bringing the sacrifices. Until he has brought them, he invalidates the service.
Why did the Torah have to teach both cases, if they are so closely related anyway? - Because each possesses its own stringency, so that the disqualification of one cannot be derived from the other. The “impure today” cannot eat the Kohen's portion, but the one who lacks atonement can. On the other hand, the one who lacks atonement needs a positive action, that is, bringing his sacrifices, whereas the one who is “impure today” only needs nightfall, which comes by itself.
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A non-Kohen. Only the priests who are the descendants of Aharon can serve in the Temple. The Torah said, “Speak to Aaron and to his sons that they shall separate themselves from the holies of the children of Israel and they shall not profane...”
A kohen whose relative, one of the seven close ones – father, mother, brother, unmarried sister, son, daughter, or spouse - has died this day. Since Aharon was specifically requested to continue the service after his two sons died, “And he need not leave the Sanctuary and he will not profane...”, we understand that all other Kohanim would profane the service.
Although the ruling above mentions only receiving the blood, the same disqualification also applies to the other two steps – carrying the blood and throwing it on the Altar. The slaughter, however, is valid if done by a non-Kohen, since the Torah said, “And he slaughters, and a Kohen receives the blood.”
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They tried to answer this question based on another rule: if a Kohen is sitting, he is disqualified from carrying the blood. It must be, therefore, that when he is standing, he can carry the blood! - No, because maybe by "sitting" the rule means moving by dragging himself in a sitting position. No proof can be deduced from here!
They tried to answer the question from a different rule: on Passover, the sacrifice would be slaughtered by its owner, and a Kohen would receive the blood, pass it to his fellow, and so on until it reached the Altar. We see from here that one does not have to walk! - No, we don't see it - perhaps they moved a little. Then why were they many? The service of God is better with many.
Rabbi Yochanan concluded, "Conveying the blood without moving one's feet is not a valid service."
Art: Jan Victors - Hannah Giving Her Son Samuel to the Priest
Said Resh Lakish, “Rabbi Shimon agrees about those offerings that are slaughtered in the Courtyard and then carried inside the Temple Hall (such as Yom Kippur offerings) that the wrong intention does invalidate them – since this walking cannot be circumvented.
Seeing that walking has somewhat lenient requirements, they asked Rav Chisda if it can be done by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda said that it can, quoting “and they slaughtered the Passover offering, and the kohanim threw the blood from their hands” - it must be that the non-kohanim who slaughtered also walked with the blood! However, Rav Sheshet disproved this, and as far as the quote, he explained that the non-kohanim just stood like pillars but did not move at all.
Art: David Roberts - Hall of Columns, Karnak, from Egypt
Rabbi Tarfon was distressed that he had previously heard from his teacher that there is a difference between the laws of receiving blood and throwing it, but he could not remember what the difference was. Rabbi Akiva deduced three points of difference on his own - for example, if one receives the blood outside the Temple, he is not liable, but if he throws the blood on an altar outside the Temple, he is liable to excision.
At this Rabbi Tarfon remembered that this was what he had learned and exclaimed, “Akiva, whoever parts from you is like one who parts from his life!”
Art: Arthur Hacker - Vale Or Farewell
A Passover offering should be brought in the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nissan, for its sake. Bringing it as any other sacrifice makes it completely invalid.
What happens if one changed two of these conditions: he brought it early, in the morning of the fourteenth, and for the sake of a different sacrifice (one can imagine that he rushed early in the morning, but then realized that it was too early and decided to bring it as a peace-offering).
Rabbi Yehoshua considers this as if he brought it on the thirteenth, and as any Passover sacrifice brought outside its time as a different one, it is valid. Ben Beteira says that morning is like afternoon, and the sacrifice is invalid.
Ben Azzai goes back to the very first ruling of this Tractate and disagrees with it, saying, based on a tradition from the seventy-two members of the Sanhedrin, that sacrifices that are eaten, if brought for a different type, are valid. This rule adds only the burnt offering to the invalid ones, but the Sages did not agree with him.
Art: Jacopo d'Antonio Negretti - Passover
What is the reason of the Sages - for seemingly, the Torah supports Rabbi Eliezer? The Sages defend with this logic: if burnt offering, which is completely burnt, is not disqualified by bringing its blood inside the Temple, then the guilt-offering, which is not completely burnt, surely cannot be thus disqualified! Now the arguments are as follows:
* burnt offering is no proof, because it does not achieve atonement!
* but the flour of a the one who swore falsely achieves atonement and still it is not disqualified if part of it is brought inside!
* but the flour does not require slaughter!
* but burnt offering does require slaughter and is not disqualified!
We came a full circle. What is common between all these? That they are holy and are not disqualified by bringing their blood inside, so the guilt-offering is not disqualified – say the Sages.
Art: Abraham Solomon - Not Guilty (The Acquittal)
Resh Lakish says that it is valid, but Rabbi Yochanan says that such a sacrifice is invalid. Rabbi Yochanan says that it is invalid, because he subscribes to the following principle: one can effectively “think ahead,” that is, that an intention that the kohen has for the following step of the service can affect what he is doing now. This result comes out because Rabbi Yochanan compares the intention that changes the type of sacrifice to the intention that changes its proper time or place, about which we will learn that it indeed disqualifies the offering. Resh Lakish holds that future intent does not count and considers the offering still valid.
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What is the reason for this ruling – really, for the second part of it, since the first part was discussed on the previous page? Said the father of Shmuel, “And if from the flock is his offering for a peace offering to God.” This teaches that something that comes from the flock (Passover) can become a peace offering.
But maybe this is so only if it is brought as peace offering? How do we know this is true for other types of sacrifices? Said Rabbi Illa in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, in the phrase “for a peace offering” the word “offering” is extra, and this teaches that the law applies to every type of sacrifice.
Art: Dieric the Elder Bouts - The Feast Of The Passover 1464-67
From where do we know this fact? From the phrase "Watch the month of spring and make a Passover offering" we derive that all actions of the Passover sacrifice should be done in the name of that sacrifice, and not any other one.
However, from this we only know that the change of the designation ruins the sacrifice. How do we know that if the priest erroneously intends that the sacrifice should belong to someone other than its true owner, that this too makes it invalid? Because of the phrase, "Say, this is the Passover sacrifice". This phase is extra and not needed to teach the previous prohibition, so we apply it to the change in ownership.
However, so far we only know the requirement not to change the designation or the ownership of the sacrifice. How do we know that if we do change it, this makes the sacrifice completely invalid? From the phrase, "Slaughter the sacrifice for the Lord your God", meaning, every action should be done as commanded.
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What happens when a Kohen slaughters a thanksgiving offering of one person for the sake of thanksgiving of his fellow? This does not mean that he wants the sacrifice of one to become the sacrifice of the other! That would a simple case of change in the ownership of the sacrifice, and it would not be credited to its owner. Rather, the Kohen meant that the offering of one owner should assume the sacred properties of another one, but still belong to the first owner.
Rabbah said that it is valid: all thanksgiving offerings are the same, even those of different people. Rav Chisda said that it is invalid: each person's thanks are different - for example, one may be thankful for successfully crossing the sea, while the other one – for being released from prison. This leads to a change in holiness, making the sacrifice not valid for its owner. The argument remains without a clear winner.
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A question was asked, can it atone for those transgressions that happened after it was designated by the owner? Since it can atone for multiple prior violations, maybe it can also atone for future ones? Or should we compare it to the sin offering? The sin offering is brought for a specific occurrences of a violation, for example, for violating Shabbat by mistake. It cannot atone for multiple transgressions, and of course it cannot it atone for future ones. If the burnt offering is like the sin offering, then it cannot atone for what happened after it was designated.
The Talmud tries to prove that the burnt offering indeed atones for the future, by comparing it to various other slight offenses, but in each attempt there is possibly another mechanism of how the atonement for this offense works, so in the end the Talmud does not resolve the question.
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He found the answer in the Torah phrase, "What emerges from your lips you shall observe and carry out, just as you vowed... a freewill offering." A freewill offering (nedavah) means that one promises to bring a sacrifice, but not a specific animal. On the other hand, a vow (“neder”) occurs when one points to an animal and promises to bring that specific animal.
Why does the Torah call it both a vow and a freewill offering? - To tell you that if you did as you vowed, and brought the offering for its sake, you have fulfilled your vow. But if you brought it not for its sake, then it becomes a freewill offering, additional to your vow; it is brought and is valid, but it does not fulfill your vow obligation.
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How do we know it? The Torah said, “And if his slaughter is for the sake of peace offering.” You could argue and say that the Torah needs to specify that it is a peace offering, and not something else. To that the answer is that the Torah already called it a peace offering in “one carries the blood of the peace offering.” What does it teach then by saying “his slaughter is for the sake?” - that it needs to be for the sake of the specific offering.
The “for the sake” requirement for other services is derived from similar verses. There is also an analogous requirement “for the sake of the owner of the sacrifice.”
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On the other hand a Get, written not for the sake of one's wife, but for the sake of a different women (provided that they have the same names) is invalid. Even if it is written for the sake of an idolatress, to whom the laws of Jewish marriage do not apply, the Get is still invalid. Thus, in the case of Get the intent for something completely different does invalidate it. Why is this difference?
He answered that in the case of divorce, if one takes the idolatress out of the picture, this Get is not intended for his wife and is thus invalid, but with sacrifices, if you take the intent for non-sacrificial meat out of the picture, it becomes no intent at all, and such sacrifices are valid.
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Exceptions to this rule are a Pesach sacrifice brought on Passover, and a sin-offering. These two, if slaughtered not for their own sake, are completely invalid.
Ravina said to Rav Pappa, “It's a pity that you were not within Shabbat boundary and could not come to us Friday night, for Rava asked a great question and resolved it.” What was it?
Rava found this contradiction: the sacrifice is not counted if slaughtered for a “wrong designation,” but if there is no designation, it is valid. A woman's Get, on the other hand, has to be written expressly for her, but if there is no designation, it is invalid. And he answered: a sacrifice, without a designation, is intended for its sake, but a woman, if not otherwise specified, will continue to be married, and does no intend to be divorced.
Art: Gerard Ter Borch - Woman Reading a Letter
