If one says to his fellow, “Blind my eye,” “Cut off my hand,” “Break my leg,” and the fellow did so, the assailant is liable to pay for the damage. Even if the first person added, “on condition that there will be no liability,” the assailant is nevertheless liable.
If one says to his fellow, “Tear my garment,” the damager is liable, but if the owner added, “on condition that there will be no liability,” - the damager is not liable.
If one steals pieces of wood and makes them into utensils, he pays the value as of the time of the robbery.
Although the assailant gives his victim compensation, the assailant is not pardoned by God until he requests forgiveness from him victim, as it says, “And God came to Avimelech in a dream by night and said to him – Behold, you are to die... but now, return the man's wife,.. [and appease him enough] so that he will [even] pray for you.”
Says Rabbi Shimon HaTimni: “an extra word fist teaches us that just as a fist, the weapon must be available for inspection,” - but Rabbi Akiva disagrees. However, they agree that an assessment is required: the court must asses that the injury was probable and not an accident.
If one humiliates someone with words, he is not liable for any payment, however, the offender may loose his share in the World to Come.
One who boxes (alternatively, shouts into) the ear of his fellow must give him a Sela ($200), but Rabbi Yehudah says, a Maneh ($5,000). If he slapped him on his cheek, he gives him 200 zuz ($10,000), if he did it with the back of his hand, 400 zuz.
If he pulled his ear, yanked his hair, spat on him and his spittle reached him, removed his cloak from him, or bared the head of a woman in the marketplace, he gives him (or her) 400 zuz ($20,000).
This is the general rule: Everything depends on the victim's level of honor, and the amount above are the maximum.
A married woman has the ability to sell her Ketubah with the stipulation that if she is widowed or divorced, the buyer will collect the entire face value of the Ketubah, but if she dies during her husband's lifetime, he will receive nothing. Since the buyer makes a significant risk in making such a purchase, the price he pays is steeply discounted form the face value of the Ketubah.
Such a sale should not be made, because a man is not allowed to keep his wife even for one hour without a Ketubah.
If the wife injures her husband, he can't collect this speculative value of the Ketubah.
One who wounds a Canaanite slave of others is liable to all five categories of payment; Rabbi Yehudah says that “...a man and his brother...” excludes a slave from humiliation payment. And the Rabbis? The slave IS your brother in (some) commandments. Then can the slave testify in court? No, since the slave is similar to a woman and a minor, who also observe some commandments, yet can't testify in court.
A wife can bequeath her possessions to her son, out of the husband's reach. However, in Usha it was enacted that the husband gets back the usufruct property bequeathed or sold by his wife.
If one injures another but it will heal, he pays for the loss of employment, but does he also pay damages for the temporary reduction in value?
Can we derive the answer from this ruling: “One who strikes his father but doesn't inflict a wound is obligated in five payments?” - No! Here he made his father bald with a depilatory cream, and his father used to dance in taverns.
One who humiliates a blind or a sleeping person is liable, but a sleeping person person that humiliated someone is not liable. In sum, one is not liable for humiliation unless he intends to injure.
How do we calculate compensation for pain? We assess how much money a person wants to give to have his hand -that is anyway inscribed to the government for amputation - anesthetized, to avoid the difference between amputation by sword and amputation by potion, presumably painless.
How do we calculate loss of employment? We view the victim as though he were a watchman of cucumbers, since this is all he can in his current state without a hand. And if you say that the person will earn more when he recovers – that payment is already included in the payment for his hand.
In the school of Rabbi Yishmael they taught, “...so shall be given upon him...” and there is no giving but money. From here we see that the assailant gives money as payment for the damage.
In the school of Chizkiyah they taught “...an eye for an eye.. and a ...life for a life...” and not a life and an eye for an eye. If it enters your mind that the payment for blinding someone is losing an actual eye, it could happen that at the time when the court was blinding the assailant he died. This means that an eye for an eye refers to a monetary payment.
One who inflicts a wound on his fellow can be liable on account of him for “five things” - five aspects of the injury:
* for actual damage; * for pain; * for healing; * for loss of employments; * and for humiliation.
How do we asses actual damage? If the assailant blinded the victim's eye, cut off his hand, or broke his leg, we view the victim as if he were a servant being sold in the market, and we appraise how much he was worth before he was wounded and how much he is worth now.
Joshua stipulated ten conditions with the settlers of the Land of Israel when he divided the land among them, and their inheritance of the land was contingent upon their acceptance, for orderly and amicable settlement. They include
* people can pasture their animals in privately-owned forests and the owners shall not object;
* they may gather wood from their fellows' fields;
* they may gather grasses for animal feed from any place;
* one may cut off shoots from another person's tree in order to plant or graft them;
* all may fish with hooks and lines in the sea of Tiberias (Kinneret).
The Rabbis wished to facilitate the Jewish settlement of the Land of Israel. They prohibited raising small domesticated animals, such as sheep and goats, in Israel - since they tend to wonder off in search of grazing and destroy the vegetation in the peoples' fields.
It is allowed to keep sheep and goats needed as sacrifices for 30 days prior to festivals. Butchers have similar allowances. It is not prohibited to raise large domesticated animals like cows in Israel, because it is hard to import them.
If one stole an animal and gave it to another person to slaughter it for him, and he slaughtered it; or he stole an animal and give it to another person to sell it for him, and he sold it – he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.
Even though the general rule is that “there is no agency for an act of transgression,” and normally the agent for sale or slaughter should bear the responsibility, this case is an exception. Since for any sale another person is needed anyway, so here too an agent may be involved for the sale or slaughter.
If someone declared, “It is hereby incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering,” and he then designated a specific ox as the offering, and another person came and stole it, the one who promised the offering is required to replace it. However, the thief can exempt himself from further liability with a lamb, which satisfies the obligation.
If the thief sold all of the stolen animal, except one-hundredth of it, or slaughtered it and made a mistake in the slaughtering so that it became non-kosher in his hands, he pays the twofold payment of an ordinary thief, but doesn't pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
When people or things contact ritual impurity from a human corpse, they may be purified by sprinkling of a mixture of water and the ashes of a red heifer.
The red heifer was slaughtered in a designated place on the Mount of Olives, which faces the portals of the Temple. Rabbi Shimon maintains that even after the red heifer was slaughtered on its pyre, it may be redeemed if a nicer heifer is found.
Similarly, if the thief slaughtered a stolen blemished offering outside the Temple, he is liable to the fourfold or fivefold payment – since that animal could be redeemed and eaten.
If one stole an ox or a sheep, then consecrated it to the Temple, and then slaughtered or sold it, he pays twofold payment for stealing, but doesn't pay the fourfold or fivefold.
Why not? Granted that when he slaughters it, it's the property of the Temple, not of the original owner.
But when he consecrates it, let this be equivalent to a sale of a stolen animal to the Temple – thus making him liable for a fourfold or fivefold payment? No! Consecration differs from a sale: after consecration the animal is still called “A sacrifice of so-and-so”, not a “sacrifice of the Temple.”
If the fact that one sold an ox or sheep was established by the testimony of two witnesses, and the fact that he then slaughtered or sold the stolen animal was established by the testimony of one witness or by his own admission, he pays the twofold payment for stealing, but not the fourfold or fivefold payment, for lack of proof.
If he stole a sheep and then slaughtered it on the Sabbath, he pays the twofold payment for stealing, but not the fourfold payment for slaughtering, because slaughtering on the Sabbath is a capital offense anyway, and “one is subject only to the greater penalty.”
Two witnesses testified that one person murdered another. Later another set of witnesses came and contradicted the first, and then also made them false witnesses by saying that “you were with us in a different place at this time and therefore could not have witnessed the murder”.
Rabbi Yochanan says that the first witnesses are executed, for although their testimony was invalidated and set aside, and they stopped being witnesses, they are still punished as false witnesses. Rabbi Elazar says that they are not executed, because the rule of “contradiction is the beginning of making witnesses false” is not true.
If the fact that one stole an ox was established by the testimony of two witnesses, and the fact that he slaughtered or sold it was established by the testimony of two other witnesses, and both pairs of witnesses were found false, the first witnesses pay a twofold payment, and the latter witnesses pay a threefold payment. If one testifies and is subsequently found to be a false witness, Abaye says that he is disqualified from serving as a witness retroactively, from the moment he testified, and all his testimonies given in the interim are invalid. This is one of the six cases abbreviated YAL K G N where the law follows Abaye against Rava.
If one steals an animal and slaughters it in the Temple, but without consecrating it as a sacrifice, he is liable to fourfold or fivefold payment. We see from here that slaughtering becomes legally valid only at the end of the cut. Had slaughtering been valid from the beginning of the cut, the animal would have become forbidden for benefit after the start of slaughter and stop belonging to the owner, resulting in no fourfold payment.
If the fact that one stole and sold an ox or sheep was established by the testimony of two witnesses, who were later found to be false witnesses, the witnesses pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
The Rama, in the Code of Jewish Law, mentions two opposite opinions on this question: 1. There is no prohibition. 2. It is prohibited. He then says that the custom is to follow the first, more lenient, opinion.
If a son cohabits with his mother who is a harlot, promising her a sheep, that sheep may not be brought as a sacrifice. She can't sue him for the sheep in court, because of “one is subject only to the greater (death) penalty,” so their deal is invalid, but the prohibition takes effect.
If one stole an ox of two partners and then admitted his liability to one of them, - he doesn't pay a fivefold payment to him, but does he pay half of it the other partner? Rav Nachman said, “No! Five oxen and not five half-oxen!” but the next morning he admited he erred due to fast.
If the fact that he stole an ox or a sheep was established by the testimony of two witnesses, and the fact that he then slaughtered or sold the stolen animal was established by their testimony as well, or by the testimony of two other witnesses, he pays fourfold and fivefold payment.
If he stole an ox or sheep and then sold it on the Sabbath, or if he then sold it for idolatry, he pays fourfold or fivefold payments. Had he slaughtered on Sabbath - which is a capital offense - he would be exempt from payment, because of the “one is subject only to the greater penalty” rule.
Rabbi Yochanan said: “If a thief stole some property and the owner did not yet despair of recovering it, neither of them can consecrate it. The thief can't consecrate it because it is not his, and the owner can't consecrate it because it is not in his possession.”
But what would be Rabbi Yochanan's source, being that there are Mishnas that rule otherwise?
His source is another Misha: One who steals a stolen item from a thief does not pay twofold payment. Why not? He doesn't pay the original owner a twofold payment because the article is not the owner's possessions – by the same token the owner can't consecrate it.
If a thief steals an object, and the owner despairs to ever get it back, does this despair effect acquisition for the thief? Rava says that it does not, because “...and you bring what is stolen, the lame, and the sick...” - just as lame has no remedy to make the offering fit, so too stealing makes it forever unfit, because it remains stolen from the owner.
However, Rabbi Elazar says that since the thief is later punished for selling the article, the only way for his sale to be valid is if he has acquired title to it through its owner's despair.
If someone stole a hide and trimmed it for use, he acquired it, and it is now susceptible to ritual impurity. If he only designated it in his mind as a tray, it also became a utensil susceptible to ritual impurity. But why should it be so, it hasn't changed?
Rav Yosef answered: it is a changed object because of a change in name. It was a hide, and is now a tray. This question remained unresolved for 22 years, until Rav Yosef was promoted to the position of the Head of the Academy and received Divine assistance in resolving questions, so that his reputation would be enhanced.
A change to the stolen object effects its acquisition for a thief. He is still liable for his theft, but if he kills and sells an ox or sheep, he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment, because now he slaughters his own animal.
In the phrase “...and he shall return the stolen article that he stole...” the extra words “as he stole” teach that if the article is as it was when he stole, he returns the article, but if the thief transformed it, he is not required to return the stolen article itself, but rather its value.
A thief pays the principal according to the value of the stolen article when he stole it; and he pays the twofold payment, fourfold and fivefold payments according to the value of the stolen article at the time that he is sued in court.
If, however, the stolen article is still in the thief's possession in its original state, he returns the article itself as is.
If an unpaid custodian claimed that a deposit he was safekeeping was stolen, and swore to that effect, but then admitted the fact that he took the item for himself, he pays the principal, adds one-fifth, and brings a guilt offering.
“Being found” and “will it be found” includes everything, and limitations ox, donkey, and sheep exclude one thing each: ox excludes land, donkey excludes slaves, and sheep exclude legal documents from twofold payment.
“If being found will it be found” excludes from the twofold payment one who incriminates himself. Even if witnesses do come after his confession, he pays only what he stole.
The rule of twofold payment applies to more situations than the rule of fourfold or fivefold payment, for the rule of twofold payment applies both to living things and to inanimate objects, whereas the rule of fourfold or fivefold payment applies only to an ox or sheep.
One who steals after a thief does not pay a twofold payment, because twofold payment applies only when “...it is stolen from the house of the man...”. Likewise, one who slaughters or sells after a thief does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.