If one sends a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, a deranged person, or a minor, the sender is not liable under the laws of man, but he is liable under Heaven's laws. If he sent fire in the hands of a mentally competent person, the sent one is liable.
If one brought the fire and another brought the wood and put it in fire, the second one is liable. If another person fanned it, he is liable. If the wind fanned it, all are exempt.
If one sends a fire and it consumes wood, stones, or earth of another, he is liable.
Art: Woman Stoking A Stove by Pierre Auguste Renoir
2 comments:
The striking thing about this one to me is the distinction between laws of Heaven and man. Under the laws of Heaven, you retain the liability if you send the fire (i.e. transport hazardous goods?)via someone who is incompetent to assume the responsibility. The laws of man can't make this distinction, so they go with the common case that if you give something over to someone, they become responsible for it. It seems to me that the Talmud is saying that only G-d can rule on "competence to assume responsibility."
Obviously, this isn't really the case - there are plenty of secular laws that recognize differences in competence between different classes of people. But ultimately, these laws lead to error: there are always cases of deranged persons, minors, or deaf mutes who are nevertheless responsible enough to "carry the fire." It's just too cumbersome, and (because we're incompetent at discernment) unjust to apply these laws.
Secular law makes these class distinctions using categories because it's the best we can do. Categorization is a hermeneutic crutch we use to understand and control the bewildering variety of the world. G-d doesn't need categories because the attribute of omniscience means that G-d knows each thing in and of itself. Therefore, G-d's laws can hand down distinctions in a just way.
Matt, I basically agree with your distinction between the laws of man and the laws of Heaven.
The Talmud law and the American law differ in the concept of causality, or “grama.” If someone causes loss indirectly, then he is still liable under the American law (even for failure to act), but not under the Talmud law, in most cases.
One who sends fire with an incompetent person does not do damage with his own hands, but only causes it indirectly. That is why he is not liable in court. If the law of the land decides to super-impose additional liability, the Talmud will recognize that, so technically there is no contradiction.
However, I would say that the reason causality doesn't lead to payment is not because it is hard to distinguish the cases, but because God wanted to limit our liability for the bad that we do in the spiritual realms, and it had to be reflected in the physical court.
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