If two potters were walking one behind the other in the public domain, and the first one stumbled and fell, and then the second one stumbled and fell over the first, the first one is liable for the damages to the second.
Although the potter lying on the ground caused the damage passively, this is a case of damage inflicted by "man" since the obstacle was his body. He is consequently liable even for the damage to the second person's utensils. Although stumbling is not negligence, he should have warned the person behind him.
Art: Pottery Painting by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema
8 comments:
What I don't understand in this sort of comment, is this: what's the authority behind this judgment? By reason alone, you could argue that the first potter suffered worse damages because he not only fell but was fallen on by the second potter, or that the fallen first potter becomes part of the public domain, an obstacle just like whatever tripped the first guy, or that they have equal damages, or that they have damages against the government for maintaining unsafe roads, or that it's an accident and they have no claim for damages against anyone. I'm not interested so much in which one is the "right" answer, but in the basis on which the Rabbis made their decision. I'm guessing that there is no comment in the Torah exactly on this point (if there were, the case would be governed by Torah law, not Talmudic law, right?) So there's got to be some sort of process here that's analogous to a government department writing regulations based on a law which governs an area generally but not this case in particular.
Matt, I totally like your approach. First of all, what is the authority of the Rabbis to establish laws? It is here, "...you shall come to the Levitical priest or the judge who is in office in those days" http://bible.cc/deuteronomy/17-9.htm and it teaches two things. One, there is a governing body, Sanhedrin, which decides the law. This does not exist today. Two, today's Rabbis are authorized to judge, at least in some measure, because of “in those days,” to which Rashi adds, “Would you come into your mind to go to someone not in your days? But it teaches one that the judge today should be considered as the top one in his days.” There are many provisos, as always in Jewish Law, of course.
Now the Rabbis have the rules which tell them how to derive laws, but they may disagree in how to apply the rules. For example, here we assume that anybody who stumbles and falls is negligent. This should be very confusing to you, because just a few pages back it was the opinion of Rabbi Meir, but the accepted law was according to Rabbi Yehudah, that the one who falls is not guilty, because falling is usually unavoidable accident. So they argued about what is more common.
But today, we find out that Rava understood the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah differently, and according to Rava, they only argue about the situation after the fall, but all agree that stumbling is negligence. Wow! Since the law is usually like Rava, this now becomes our accepted point of view, and we in fact change our mind. I love it, because I love changing my mind.
All of this I have to put into hints, so that people like you would see the unsaid and ask.
Thanks Mark, but it still makes no sense to me. You've got an injunction in Deuteronomy that we ought to go to the "judge who is in office in those days," but that sheds no light on how the judge him/herself should judge. You say "the Rabbis have the rules which tell them how to derive laws, but they may disagree in how to apply the rules...." But the text doesn't provide that authority and allow you to assess the interpretation. Instead you get various Rabbis arguing about the principle. What's rigorous about this? Yehuda says falling is usually unavoidable [his opinion? Biblical?] and Meir disagrees [based on what?] Then, Rava chooses to elide the disagreement by manufacturing a distinction between stumbling and the consequences of stumbling. On what basis? And to what effect? How can you meaningfully define an act as something one isn't responsible for, and then define the direct consequences of that act as something one is responsible for?
Matt, Too many quotes required, so no links, sorry, all from memory – pardon my errors.
> You've got an injunction in Deuteronomy that we ought to go to the "judge who is in office in those days," but that sheds no light on how the judge him/herself should judge.
Moses appointed judges, wise, honest, and hateful of unjust gain. That is the Sanhendrin. http://bible.cc/numbers/11-16.htm Then there will be heads of tens, heads of hundreds, and so on, so that there is a court system. They judge according to the laws “As I have taught you in private” - says God. I can't conceal any further that most laws were taught to Moses by God and are not recorded in the Bible. That is what the Mishna is.
> You say "the Rabbis have the rules which tell them how to derive laws, but they may disagree in how to apply the rules...." But the text doesn't provide that authority and allow you to assess the interpretation.
So now the Rabbis study all of the laws. Ideally, they know all 4190 Mishnas, by heart, with the Gemora and later commentaries, depending upon what time they live in and what later commentaries there are. There is also logic, which is considered a superior way, but sometimes logic does not dictate which way to go, and then you rely on Torah/Talmud law. Logic has another problem – it can be disproved later on, whereas a clear Talmud law will stand if it is based on an uninterrupted chain from Moses.
> What's rigorous about this? Yehuda says falling is usually unavoidable [his opinion? Biblical?] and Meir disagrees [based on what?]
That is one of the axioms which can be used to view the world. For example, Rabbi Meir's view is that we take small minorities into account – and formulate our laws based on that. For example, there is a minority of girls who don't fully develop, and therefore a man who married such a girl made a mistaken buy and a marriage is void. Should we always suspect that this is the case and forbid marrying under circumstances which can create a problem? Rabbi Meir will say “yes,” the Rabbis “no,” and this is an axiom which will lead to two different legal worlds. You have the same in math, where you can have parallels not crossing or parallels crossing, and this leads to three different kinds of geometry: Euclidean, hyperbolic, and elliptic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Euclidean_geometry
> Then, Rava chooses to elide the disagreement by manufacturing a distinction between stumbling and the consequences of stumbling. On what basis?
Aha! Now you are hitting another thing that should bother you. Those Rabbis seem to have too many cards up their sleeves. Who permits them to establish the cases in such unusual circumstances, explaining away our problems, or changing the answers altogether. But the answer is right here: you just need to know what is up their sleeves. Meaning, you need to learn the rest of the discussion, and you will find out that there was a collection of accepted approaches to the problem discussed already for hundreds of years, and Rava just sides with one point of view, perhaps adding his own insight.
Conclusion? Boy, you are bright, hit on the right points and I will be happy to keep answering. If you want to do it yourself, Artscroll is great, and you can start with Sanhendrin discussing how the judgment process goes (kind of Civil Procedure 101), or just continue with this Bava Kamma.
Finally, a well-known truism of why Bava Kamma and damages in general make one smart: in ritual it is easy to say “forbidden” and be on the safe side. Can I play chess on Shabbat? On Rosh HaShana? - No! - and you are done. In damages, you need understanding and correct answer, because one person's win is another's loss, and no such thing as “forbidden” answer.
All the best,
Mark
Hi Mark,
This is fun, forgive me for staying with yesterdays piece a bit more. I'm suspicious of an argument that includes "So now the Rabbis study all of the laws. Ideally, they know all 4190 Mishnas, by heart, with the Gemora and later commentaries, depending upon what time they live in and what later commentaries there are."
Basically, that's like saying "Go away till you've spent a lifetime studying this stuff on its own terms, and then come back and tell me that it's not worth studying for a lifetime on its own terms." Like that'll happen.
I was also both attracted and repelled by your analogy to parallel lines. I'm no more a mathematician than I am a Rabbi, but the three you mentioned aren't really separate approaches to the same problem (e.g. "what happens to parallel lines?") In the mathematical case, different environments (2 dimensional, 3 dimensional, etc.) have to be taken into account. Once they are, there is one right answer for the appropriate environment. In the rabbinical case, there's nothing exogenous about the environment, so you're never able to find a solution by saying "in the case of Yehuda's argument, such and such is the case; if we live in the world of Rava's argument then the other is correct." -- the Rabbi's arguments are endogenous.
This one for sure does not make sense. Should one in a car crash into one in front of him because he is tailgating the 2nd one is liable. It should be the second one who is not only liable for his pot but also liable because he could not put his pot down and come to the aid of his fellow. I would add that if the second potter fell on top of the first one he would most likely be tailgaiting as well and probably tripped over the same object on the floor as the first one who fell more than likely fell forward. it seems that too much of a pass the buck theory is going on in bava kamma without good old personal responsibilty that i thought was on of the foundatiuons of our faith.
David,
If the potter could have stood up, he should have, or else he is liable. In car world, the guy needs to clear his stalled vehicle off the freeway. If the potter saw that he is not standing up, he should have stopped the other guy. In the car world, if the driver saw that he is busy changing tire, he should have displayed warning signs.
Our collisions are all different than these cases, because potters had choices to stand up or to warn.
The place where i find out, after Artscroll, was the audio, which is found on the talmud page. I will be giving links to that from now on. Thanks to you. And then there is a beautiful case of three-way collision, but I will leave this to your curiosity.
Matt,
> So now the Rabbis study all of the laws. Ideally, they know all 4190 Mishnas,... Basically, that's like saying "Go away till you've spent a lifetime studying this stuff on its own terms, and then come back and tell me that it's not worth studying for a lifetime on its own terms." Like that'll happen.
That can be understood in two senses. One is indeed, go and learn it all, and it is a classical "long short road." href=”http://tinyurl.com/cnm7fl Here it means that the complete road is indeed long but every day you make a step that makes you feel as if you journeyed the whole way.
But I meant it only to show how the judges should judge, to answer your previous question.
> I'm no more a mathematician than I am a Rabbi, but the three you mentioned aren't really separate approaches to the same problem (e.g. "what happens to parallel lines?")
I am totally sorry to disagree. I have once heard a lecture where the Rabbi said, “I am not a musician, but I know that one note means nothing and you need to start changing them to create a melody.” Here is a quote from the expert. Sviatoslav Richter, world-renowned concert pianist had this to say: “If you are real musician, you will be fascinated by one note. You can sit all day and play the SOL (G), listening to it.”
If somebody told the Rabbi - “Hebrew letters mean nothing by themselves, it is when you make words out of them that the meaning begins to appear,” - he would argue, if he were worth any salt, that the letters are the basic building elements, mean a lot, and are much more important than the meaning (see Zohar, the story of letters arguing which one should be used to create the world).
So back to the mathematical analogy, the people at first did not understand what the mathematicians Lobachevsky and Riemann were saying. There are three possible geometrical universes. Not 2 and 3 dimensional, but three possible 3-dimensional universes. They are non-contradictory in the mathematical sense. The wikipedia only discuses how to model them for our understanding. Which is our physical world? The physicists measured it, and it turned out to be that our world is Lobachevsky's, that the parallel always meet.
> if we live in the world of Rava's argument then the other is correct." -- the Rabbi's arguments are endogenous.
Now you are absolutely getting it! There is an ideal world of Rava, and it is not the same as the word of Abbaye. However, there is only one physical worlds that we are concerned with, so how do we describe it? There are rules for deciding the final law, such as Rava wins against Abbaye in all but six cases (abbreviated as YALKGN), and basically the final law, as decided, describes our world.
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