Tuesday, June 30, 2015

Nedarim 37 – Making money on the Torah?

Earlier, we saw that one cannot take money to teach Torah. We also noticed that when this teaching is for singing the notes of the Torah, as sung in the synagogue, or simply for watching the kids so that they don't run out during lessons, then getting paid for this is acceptable.

But which of these two reasons is the real one? Some say that the singing notes were actually given to Moses together with the rest of the Torah: when Ezra read Torah to the people, he made them "understand the reading," – which is achieved with proper notes; thus, no money can be earned for teaching that.

Others argue that "understanding the reading" refers to proper pronunciation since there are places in the Torah where the words should not be read the way they are written. However, the notes were introduced by the Sages of the court of Solomon later, and reward may be taken for teaching them.

According to the first point of view, one is not paid for singing but for watching the children. This sounds reasonable; what will the opposing side say? They will answer that boys and girls are equally taught and that little girls cause less trouble and don't run out of the room – so one is not paid for watching them, and we are back to paying for singing.

Art: Portrait of Artist's Children by Jan Matejko

Nedarim 36 – Sorry, I cannot teach you Torah

One who vowed not to provide any benefit to his fellow is not allowed to teach him Torah; however, he is allowed to teach him the moral lessons and stories about the Torah (Midrash), as well as teach Torah to his sons and daughters.

Basically, why should Torah be taught for free? Moses said, "Look, I taught you the Torah, for free, just as God commanded me," – and you should also teach for free. Then if so, why is teaching Torah considered a benefit, which one should not confer on his fellow if he vowed against him? – We mean teaching the written Torah, and one takes money for teaching the melody, not the words. Alternatively, the art of reading the written Torah is usually taught to small children, and one receives money for being their babysitter rather than a teacher. However, moral lessons are for adults, and one cannot take the reward.

The rule says one can teach the fellow's sons and daughters. This rule is the source for the view that Torah should be taught to women as well as men.

Art: A Lady With Her Daughter And Two Sons by Dutch School

Monday, June 29, 2015

Nedarim 35 – How strong are your vows?

If one declares some object forbidden to himself by a vow, just like a sacrifice, is the prohibition really that strong? For example, if he uses this object after all, does he need to bring an additional sacrifice ("Me'ila"), just as he would have for misusing a sacrifice?

Perhaps we can prove this is so from the previous ruling. There, one was allowed to return a lost object even to someone he vowed not to provide any benefit. However, he could not take the reward for this but had to give it to the Temple treasury. Does this not prove the point? – Actually, this is indeed strong proof.

We find that Rabbi Meir and the Sages argued about this exact point. And since every Sage in the Talmud builds a system of consistent teachings without contradictions, we can rely on them to verify that both points of view are logical and can be valid.

And what did Rabbi Meir and the Sages argue about? – If one prohibits himself from a loaf of bread by a vow and then eats it, he has to bring a Me'ila offering to atone - this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Sages, however, say that since this loaf is not equally prohibited to all, the concept of Me'ila does not apply. And yet, since the previous rule proves that Rabbi Meir is right, the final law follows him.

Art: Studies of bread by Spanish School

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Nedarim 33 – He paid off your debt? – You don't owe him anything!

If one person (A) makes a vow not to provide any benefit to his fellow B, he (A) is still allowed to pay off B's debts. How could it be? – By paying off B's debts, A is simply "chasing a lion away from B's property." That is, he is precluding B's creditors from running after him at some future date, which is not a benefit.

But wait, it is a benefit, after all!? – This follows the opinion of Chanan, which we learned earlier: if one goes overseas and leaves his wife without sustenance, and his fellow provides her with money on his own, the husband is not obligated to repay.

Are there any other opinions? – Yes, those who disagree with Chanan say it is a benefit. Or, if you want, I can explain that the rule about paying off debts is universally accepted. I can say that loan B does not have any fixed date for payment. Then the creditors will never come to B because the "future date" mentioned above does not exist! So A provided no benefit, and even though he vowed against B, he is still allowed to do this service.

Another thing that A is allowed to do is pay the half-shekel obligation. Everyone had to pay the half-shekel yearly to provide money for daily sacrifices, but even if he did not pay in the end, he still gets the atonement; thus, paying it for one's fellow is not a benefit.

Finally, he is allowed to return the fellow's lost object because he is doing a mitzvah. If in his place, they pay for the trouble of bringing the lost object, he should donate this money to the Temple.

Art: Lost by Frederick McCubbin

Wednesday, June 24, 2015

Nedarim 26 – Clear mistakes

One can make an obvious mistake in his vow; if so, the vow does not count, and he does not have to fulfill it. For example, “This food is prohibited to me by a vow if I ate anything today – or if I drank today” – and then he remembers that he did eat or drink.

Another example: “Let my wife be prohibited to me by a vow since she stole my wallet – or since she hit my son” – and it turns out that she did not do such a thing. Yet another example: he sees people eating his dates and vows the dates to be prohibited to them, and then discovers that his father or his brother were with these people – all such vows are void.

In the same way, mistaken oaths are void. For example, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi both took an oath that their teacher said something, and their oaths clearly contradicted. When it was found out that one of them was correct and supported by others, the oath was still not false because, as far as the other one could ascertain, he believed to be telling the truth.

Art: Peasants preparing food in a courtyard by North-Italian School

Tuesday, June 23, 2015

Nedarim 25 – Tricks when taking an oath

Just as one can make a vow to motivate his friend to eat with him, and the vow won't be binding since he only meant it for friendly coercion, so one can take a similar oath, which will be no oath at all, and he won't violate a prohibition of swearing falsely.

For example, one can say, “I swear, and let all the fruit of this world be prohibited to me if I have not seen on the road as many as pilgrims going to Jerusalem!”

But perhaps he saw ants and called them “pilgrims,” and is thus swearing truly!? – No, that cannot be because anyone who takes an oath does so on ordinary people's understanding of words, not on his terms.

But if so, why do the standard formulas mention “swear on our understanding, not on yours?” – That is to prevent incidents like the following. One person was going to swear that he returned the money to his fellow, who left it for safekeeping. He put the coins in a walking stick, asked the depositor to hold the stick while he himself was holding the Torah scroll, and swore that he returned the money and that it was in the depositor's hands. At which the depositor became so infuriated that the broke the stick, the money fell out, and it came out that man swore truly.

But did not Moses himself say, “Keep in mind that you swear today to observe the Torah and do this on mine and God's understanding of this?” The Talmud then discusses all possible ways Moses could have put this into the oath to make the contract unbreakable but finds ways to misinterpret them and get out from under the obligation. In the end, the Talmud finds unbreakable verbiage, which is more complex, so it tells that Moses just used the shortest way.

Art :An Old Woman Weighing Gold Coins by Rembrandt School

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Nedarim 24 – Should one say “Kol Nidre?”

On the previous page, the teacher hid his advice while giving it. Although one can annul all his vows for the upcoming year by saying "Kol Nidre," the teacher left it unsaid, and only special people knew through careful reading what he meant. One Sage wanted to publicize the device, but Rava rebuked him: the teacher hid it, and you want to reveal it!?

Talmud also wants to know whether other Sages agreed with this teacher (Rabbi Elazar ben Yaakov). After multiple unsuccessful attempts, it finds clear proof that other Sages disagreed. Yet, the law follows Rabbi Elazar ben Yakov, and the annulment of all vows at the beginning of the year is permitted.

We saw that when one presses his friend to accept an invitation and even vows to forbid something should the friend not accept, such a vow is not taken seriously – it is just a matter of speech, designed as motivation to accept.

There is another similar category: if one says that he just saw as many people on the road as those that went to Jerusalem, that is, 600,000, and if not, he is taking a vow to forbid himself something, this is just an exaggeration, and the vows does not need annulment by the Sage. A similar vow will be if he says, "I just saw a snake like a beam of a vine press!"

Art: Invitation to Dance by Peter Baumgartner